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THE CRAFT OF THE CRIMINAL APPEAL
By JACK S. NORDBY'I"
In this Article Mr. Nordby discusses effective advocacy in a
criminal appeal. Most of his remarks will apply to preparation
and presentation of appeals in any court, but Mr. Nordby also
examines in detail the requirements of practice in the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
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I. FOREWORD: THE NATURE OF A CRIMINAL APPEAL
An appeal, Hinnissy, is where ye ask wan coort to show its
contempt f'r another coort.
-Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley Says: The Big Fine
One of the majesties of our legal system is that the lowest rascal
may invoke the powers of the loftiest courts to vindicate his
rights. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed: "It is a fair
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice
people."'
1. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals said in a commencement address
published in 46 N.D. L. RaV. 269, 273 (1970):
Judge Pound of the New York Court of Appeals made the statement sometime
ago that best summarizes the concern with due process in criminal procedure
when he said: "Although the defendant may be the worst of men the rights of
the best of men are secure only as the rights of the most violent and most
abhorrent are protected." I wonder if it would not cast some light if lawyers and
judges, who profess to understand the law, could respond to informal criticism
of the Supreme Court by paraphrasing Judge Pound saying, that we should all
remember "that the rights of the best of men are secure only as long as the rights
of the worst of men are protected."
John F. Dillon wrote in his LAws AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 152
(1894): "The most satisfactory ideal I have ever been able to form of justice is embodied
in the picture of a judge courageous enough 'to give the devil his due,' whether he be in
the right or in the wrong." He was, perhaps, echoing Sir Thomas More, as reported in
William Roper's LInFE OF Sm THOMAS MORE 41 (1822): "[If the parties will at my hand
call for justice, then . . . were it my father stood on the one side, and the devil on the
other, his cause being good, the devil should have right." Quintillian warns against a
[Vol. 4
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Only a robust government can afford to extend such tenderness
to its transgressors. Or perhaps the converse is closer to the truth:
only a society which guarantees the greatest protections to the
least of its members can expect to prosper. In either case, appel-
late review of criminal convictions plays a most important role in
our mechanism for preserving ordered liberty.' It is fair to say
that safeguards of liberty are most often forged in the federal
circuit courts; the Supreme Court decides few cases,3 the federal
district courts publish relatively few opinions of precedential
value, and the state courts cannot speak conclusively upon fed-
eral constitutional issues.' We do not, I think, overvalue the fed-
eral criminal appeal if we say that it makes the Federal Reporter
the chief repository of our most rudimentary rights, privileges,
and immunities.
The appeal of a conviction to a federal court of appeals is, for
practical purposes, the last resort, the Gettysburg of the criminal
process.5 The likelihood that the Supreme Court will grant cer-
tiorari, much less reverse the conviction, is usually so slight as not
to enter rational calculations.6 Yet one might as well begin by
danger of excess in such efforts at neutrality: "For there is sometimes, in unprincipled
judges, a foolish propensity to give sentence against their friends, or in favour of parties
with whom they are at enmity, and to act unjustly that they may not seem to be unjust."
1 QUINTHrILL'S INsTrrUTES OF ORATORY 257 (J. Watson trans. 1822).
2. An appeal from a criminal conviction is not a constitutional right, although it is a
federal statutory right. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 441 (1962); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). Therefore, states may
accord the right to appeal in such cases as they deem proper. See Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S.
394 (1959), vacated second hearing on other grounds, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (the sixth
amendment and the equal protection clause require that counsel be provided for an
indigent upon the first appeal from a state criminal conviction).
3. See note 6 infra.
4. Moreover, the federal courts have often been the forum for vindication of constitu-
tional rights denied by state courts, particularly under civil rights acts, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970), and the habeas corpus provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). See, e.g., Town-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Recently, however, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have begun to reverse the trend toward federal court intervention into issues arising
in state prosecutions. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal courts will
not hear claims of fourth amendment violations where the accused had a chance for full
and fair litigation of the issue in state court); Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745 (8th Cir.
1977) (quoting Stone).
5. In a recent article, Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit refers to the same event,
reminding advocates writing briefs that President Lincoln's Gettysburg Address was a
mere ten sentences long. See Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes-Effective
Advocacy on Appeal, 30 Sw. L.J. 801, 816 (1976).
6. In 1975, for example, only 17 appeals from federal criminal convictions found their
way to the United States Supreme Court. Of these 17, only three were decided against
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recognizing a hard truth: an appeal from a criminal conviction is
probably going to fail. The large majority of criminal appeals are
affirmed;7 and they are going to be affirmed no matter how com-
petent, diligent, and imaginative appellant's counsel may be.' It
is as simple as that, and that may be reason enough to discourage
a sane and reasonably self-confident lawyer from making the ef-
fort. Few fields of professional endeavor hold less promise of suc-
cess. Advocacy on behalf of criminal appellants is not a pursuit
for the lawyer whose vanity cannot envision or absorb defeat.
The defendant has already lost all the major battles, or there
would be no occasion for the appeal. A presumptively impartial
and competent judge has ruled against him on all dispositive
points of law; a jury has found the facts against him. Appellate
counsel's gaze meets a bleak battleground, strewn with the car-
rion of fallen issues; the only remaining hope is to revive the lame
and halt for a last assault in the court of appeals.
At trial, the defendant is clothed with the presumption of inno-
cence 9 as well as myriad rights, privileges, and benefits of the
the government. See The Supreme Court - 1975 Term, 90 HAIv. L. REv. 1, 281 (1976)
(tabulating the cases in which full opinions were written).
7. Figures provided by the docketing clerk of the Eighth Circuit indicate that the 995
filings in fiscal year 1976 were allocated as follows:
Criminal 15%
United States Civil 31%
Private Civil 43%
Agency Cases 9%
(labor board cases; social security)
Original Cases 2%
(mandamus, prohibition)
And of the 995 cases, the following percentiles of reversals occurred:
Criminal 3%
(reversed in part or remanded, add 1/2%)
United States Civil 3%
(reversed in part or remanded, add 1/2%)
Private Civil 8%
(reversed in part, add 2%; remanded, add 1%)
Agency 1%
Criminal case reversals would include appeals by the government, further reducing the
success ratio of criminal defendants.
8. Chief Judge Stanley Fuld, formerly of the New York Court of Appeals, has said that
80% of all criminal appeals would probably be affirmed even if government counsel sub-
mitted only a token brief. Steinberg, The Criminal Appeal, in COUNSEL ON APPEAL 8 (A.
Charpentier ed. 1968).
9. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-60 (1895) (relating the history of the
presumption from Biblical times), aff'd second hearing, 162 U.S. 664 (1896). See also Cupp
v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973) (instruction that "[elvery witness is presumed to speak
the truth" does not necessarily place the burden of proving innocence upon the defend-
ant).
[Vol. 4
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doubt. 10 The weighty burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is on the government, and the defendant need do absolutely noth-
ing and may still win. On appeal, the positions are reversed.
Presumptions favor the result below." Therefore the burden of
going forward and the burden of persuasion are on the appellant,
who has had his day in court and is no longer viewed by the law
as an underdog in need of artificial advantages.
Counsel should not have to be reminded by the reviewing court
that it does not sit as a super jury to retry the facts,"2 or to second-
guess exercises of the trial judge's discretion. 3 As Judge Bright
of the Eighth Circuit has put it: "We judges are not going to let
you re-try your case on appeal . "14 The task is usually not
to sponsor a theory of innocence or to persuade a factfinder of a
lack of proof, but to demonstrate that despite his proved guilt,
the defendant deserves a new trial because of technical defects
which amount to denial of a fair trial. Thus, a radical difference
in attitude, approach, and destination distinguishes appellate
counsel from the trial lawyer.
The goal of an appeal is reversal. Counsel's role, every bit as
much as at trial, is that of the advocate. Defeat is never accept-
able, nor can he take satisfaction merely in a job well done, even
if, as occasionally happens, the court praises losing counsel's ef-
forts. 5 But, of course, there must be satisfaction-a scholar's sat-
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (immunity from double jeopardy; privilege against self-
incrimination; right to due process); id. amend. VI (rights to trial by jury, confront wit-
nesses, compel testimony of favorable witnesses, and counsel).
11. A reviewing court must entertain a presumption of validity as to the decision and
the correctness of the proceedings in the lower court. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
468 (1938) (habeas corpus proceeding). Conversely, the reviewing court will not indulge a
presumption which is unfavorable to the challenged ruling. See, e.g., Bear Lake & R.
Water Works & Irrigation Co. v. Garland, 164 U.S. 1, 25 (1896). Or, as it has been
expressed: "On appeal all intendments are in favor of the correctness of the judgment."
Kirk v. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 206 F.2d 283, 287 (8th Cir. 1953) (civil case).
12. See, e.g., United States v. McColgin, 535 F.2d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942): "The verdict of a jury must be sustained
if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it."); Civella v. United States, 509 F.2d 896, 898 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(appellate court does not try cases de novo).
13. The Eighth Circuit court has stated: "It is a fundamental rule of our appellate
procedure that the trial judge will not be reversed after using his considered judgment on
discretionary orders provided there has been no abuse of such discretion." Kansas City
Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 649 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
For a discussion of abuse of discretion, see notes 167-74 infra and accompanying text.
14. Bright, The Changing Nature of the Federal Appeals Process in the 1970's, 65
F.R.D. 496, 502 (1975).
15. Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit observes: "[E]very judge has a collateral inter-
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isfaction and an advocate's satisfaction-in the work of preparing
the appeal if advocacy is to be effective. Confidence that the job
has been done well will communicate itself to the court, as will a
lack of confidence, in both the brief and oral argument. Only
what appellate counsel writes and says remains between the ac-
cused and the prison door. If the advocate is not persuaded of his
cause, the court is not likely to be.
The best description I have seen of appellate counsel's task is
found not in a study of appellate advocacy, or even of law, but in
a work of literary criticism. In his book, Aspects of the Novel,
E.M. Forster wrote:'1
Genuine scholarship is one of the highest successes our race
can achieve. No man is more triumphant than the man who
chooses a worthy subject and masters all its facts and the lead-
ing facts of the subjects neighbouring. He can then do what he
likes.
Perhaps more than any other aspect of the law, appellate practice
calls upon all the advocate's most important resources. The job
is difficult, the stakes high. In criminal cases, the Constitution is
usually more or less directly implicated. 7 Research is crucial;
writing is crucial; speaking is crucial. There is seldom any margin
for error. Yet, unlike in the heat of trial, there is time to reflect,
study, rewrite, and rehearse. This time to master the case enables
counsel, in Forster's phrase, to "do what he likes." This is per-
haps the only true advantage falling to appellant's counsel.
If I have learned nothing else from my experience in appellate
advocacy, if I can impart no other wisdom, there are two princi-
ples which I believe must be assimilated by appellate counsel:
est, a sense of pleasure and pride, in seeing the advocate's job well-done." Godbold, supra
note 5, at 808 n.19.
16. E. FoPSTER, AsPECTs OF THE NOVEL 22 (1954); accord, 0. HoLMEs, SPEECHES 23 (1913)
("To be master of any branch of knowledge, you must master those which lie next to it
. .. ). There is a peculiar and lamentable lack of communication between the law and
literary arts. This is strange and unfortunate, since both depend upon intellectual persua-
sion. Advocacy has been called an art, and surely it is. See, e.g., Prettyman, Some Obser-
vations Concerning Appellate Advocacy, 39 VA. L. REv. 285, 285 (1953); Steinberg, supra
note 8, at 3. See generally L. STRYKER, THE ART OF ADvOCACY (1954). But insofar as
published opinions and law review articles represent the best of the bar's literary accom-
plishments, it must be admitted that as a profession we display all too rarely the lucidity,
accuracy, and evocativeness which characterize the best prose. For some splendid excep-
tions, however, see THE LITERATURE OF THE LAw (L. Blom-Cooper ed. 1965) and 2 TE
WORLD OF LAw: THE LAw As LrElwTuRE (E. London ed. 1960).
17. See note 10 supra.
[Vol. 4
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(1) The probability of prevailing on appeal will be enhanced
by counsel's perception of the real obstacles to success, and
diminished by his ignorance of them.
(2) An appeal is not the trial re-fought, but more nearly an
inversion or mirror image of the proceedings below, with the
operative mechanisms reversed; critical aspects of the trial often
lose their significance on appeal, while other factors assume new
importance.
Much of what follows is merely a gloss upon these observations.
They are important throughout the appellate process: in evaluat-
ing the desirability of an appeal; in explaining the appeal to the
client and estimating for him the prospects for success; and in
preparing the brief and oral argument.
Set forth below are what I see as some of the more significant
and sometimes less obvious tools of scholarship and persuasion
which make for effective appellate advocacy. The applicability of
any advice is, of course, subject to the peculiarities of each case
and the rules of the jurisdiction involved. And this is not an
exhaustive handbook of appellate practice, 8 but a suggested ap-
proach to appellate craftsmanship, containing some general and
some quite specific suggestions which I hope will, from time to
time, point the way to a more effective technique.
II. THE APPLICABLE RULES OF COURT
Master the applicable rules. No apology is offered for this bit
of elementary advice, for the rules are many, located in several
places, sometimes complex, and frequently violated. Nothing is
a more obvious and inexcusable blemish upon an appellate effort
than failure to comply with them. For example: What size paper
should be used for typewritten documents? I expect many lawyers
will be mildly surprised, as I was some years after I began practic-
ing, to realize they do not know the answer. If you do know, on
18. Perhaps the best handbooks in this area are H. LEVY, How TO HANDLE AN APPEAL
(1968); E. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT (4th ed. 1974); and F. WIENER, BRIEFING
AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (1967). For matters in the Supreme Court, see R. STERN &
E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTiCE (4th ed. 1969).
Judge Bright of the Eighth Circuit and Robert Tucker, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, also have written excellent articles on the subject. See Bright, supra
note 14; Tucker, Suggestions to Attorneys Concerning Appellate Rules and Practice, 23
F.R.D. 47 (1959). See also Comm'n on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1976);
Orfield, Appellate Review of the Facts in Criminal Cases, 12 F.R.D. 311 (1952); Rossman,
Appellate Practice and Advocacy, 16 F.R.D. 403 (1955).
19781
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what authority do you rely? 9 I pose such an apparently simple
question hoping to emphasize the importance of knowing the
rules, even in the most basic matters. Nothing could more elo-
quently proclaim counsel's ignorance of the rules than the arrival
of his filings on paper of the wrong size."
I shall not review all of the rules in detail because they are
readily available2 and for the most part easily understandable.
Some selective guidance, though, may be helpful. All appeals to
the United States Courts of Appeals from the federal district
courts are governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure,'2 2 as augmented by local rules adopted by the judges of each
circuit.2 In addition to the local rules, the circuit court may adopt
a Plan to Expedite Criminal Appeals.24 As the title suggests, the
Plan addresses primarily the time limitations and priorities for
processing criminal appeals.25 Many circuits have also adopted a
19. The correct size is 8 1/2 by 11 inches under FED. R. APP. P. 32(b).
20. Adherence to the rule regarding paper size is not mere pedantry. Filing cabinets,
bookshelves, and other repositories of legal papers are made of a certain size; a larger
document simply will not fit without folding.
21. The local rules and various plans for the Eighth Circuit are published in the form
of a booklet which is available from the clerk. They may also be found in 28 U.S.C.A.,
FEDERAL RuLEs OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977) and U.S.C.S.,
COUsr RuLEs - RuLEs OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. May 1977).
Minnesota attorneys may also find the rules in 27B MINN. STAT. ANN. (West 1968 & Cum.
Supp. 1977).
22. See FED. R. APP. P. 1(a).
23. FED. R. APP. P. 47 allows a majority of the judges of each circuit to "make and
amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules" and to "regulate their
practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules" in all cases not provided for by
the federal rules. For a discussion of the local rules of the Eighth Circuit, see notes 30-39
infra and accompanying text.
24. FED. R. CaMu. P. 50(b) (1977) (requiring district courts to conduct "continuing
study" of its criminal justice system and "prepare plans for the prompt disposition -of
criminal cases"); see, e.g., 8TH CIR. PLAN EXPEDITE CRIM. APP. (1977). For a discussion of
this plan as adopted by the Eighth Circuit, see notes 40-55 infra and accompanying text.
25. The objective and priorities of the Eighth Circuit's plan are as follows:
The objective of this plan is the disposition of criminal cases in this Court within
a maximum of five months from the filing of the notice of appeal to the rendition
of the decision of this Court.
• . . Priority is to be given to criminal appeals in this Court by court reporters
in the preparation of transcripts of testimony, attorneys in the preparation of
briefs and records and in scheduling professional and personal obligations, the
Clerk of this Court in calendaring cases for argument or submission without
argument, and the judges of this Court in the rendition of decisions and the
preparation of opinions.
. . . The criminal appeals of persons in custody or whose liberty is reasonably
[Vol. 4
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Plan for the Publication of Opinions 2 to curtail the proliferation
of published opinions.27 Finally, each circuit is required to have
a Plan to Implement the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 which
governs appointment and compensation of counsel for the indi-
gent.2
A thorough familiarity with each of these sets of rules is essen-
tial. The first step should be simply to read them, cover to cover,
in order to be exposed to the substance of the rules and to gain
some insight into the interrelations between the different sets of
provisions. A knowledge of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, although they are applicable in all the circuits, is inade-
quate because the local rules and the various plans may deviate
significantly from them.
The local rules, plans, and timetable for appeals in the Eighth
Circuit are discussed below. The location, personnel, and miscel-
laneous practical aspects of practice in the Eighth Circuit are set
out in the margin. 2
believed to present a danger to society are to be given preference over other
criminal cases.
8TH CIR. PLAN ExPEDrrE CriM. APP. I-Il (1977).
26. See D.C. Cm. R. 13; 1sT CIR. R. app. B; 4TH Cm. R. 18; 7TH CiR. R. 35; 9TH CIR. R.
21 (1977); 10TH CIR. R. 17. The Eighth Circuit adopted its plan on January 11, 1973. See
8Tm Cm. PLAN PuB. Op. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's plan, see notes 56-61 infra
and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., 8TH CIR. PLAN PUB. OP. (1).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See generally 8TH Cm. PLAN IMPLE-
MENT CRIM. JUST. AcT. The present article does not attempt to address problems peculiar
to in forma pauperis appeals, to which various provisions apply. See FEn. R. APP. P. 24.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, while he was an Eighth Circuit judge, wrote an excellent article
regarding in forma pauperis appeals. See Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis
Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343 (1968).
29. Local practices vary considerably in different circuits. The focus of this Article, to
the extent it is not general, is upon practice in the Eighth Circuit; readers practicing in
other jurisdictions should, of course, consult their local rules.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is located at:
U.S. Court and Custom House
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
Telephone: (314) 425-5600
The judges of the court currently are:
Circuit Justice:
Harry A. Blackmun, Washington, D.C.
Chief Judge:
Floyd R. Gibson, Kansas City, Missouri
Circuit Judges:
Myron H. Bright, Fargo, North Dakota
Gerald W. Heaney, Duluth, Minnesota
J. Smith Henley, Harrison, Arkansas
19781
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A. The Local Rules of the Eighth Circuit
Several Eighth Circuit rules deserve particular attention. Ex-
tensions of time in criminal cases must be ruled upon by the
court, not by the clerk;"0 and it is the court's express policy that
"[p]ast practices in liberally granting extension of time . . . will
no longer be followed."3 In the Eighth Circuit, all criminal mat-
ters may be heard on the original record below, 2 thus dispensing
with the cumbersome and expensive task of preparing, reproduc-
Donald P. Lay, Omaha, Nebraska
Donald P. Ross, Omaha, Nebraska
Roy L. Stephenson, Des Moines, Iowa
William H. Webster, St. Louis, Missouri
Senior Judges:
M.C. Matthes, St. Louis, Missouri
Pat Mehaffy, Little Rock, Arkansas
Martin D. Van Oosterout, Sioux City, Iowa
Charles J. Vogel, Fargo, North Dakota
Visiting judges from other jurisdictions also regularly sit in many circuits, including
district judges. Mr. Justice Clark sat on circuit courts, including the Eighth, after his
retirement from the Supreme Court.
The clerk is Robert Tucker, and the appeals expediter is W. Wayne Buckner. It is with
these gentlemen that counsel will deal primarily in processing criminal appeals.
The court holds one general term beginning on the second Monday in September, and
sessions at times and places designated by the court. 8TH Cm. R. 1. Most sessions are in
St. Louis, and all correspondence should be directed to the address above, but counsel
should confirm the location of any appearance to avoid the embarrassment of arriving in
St. Louis only to find that the court is waiting for him in St. Paul, where it ordinarily sits
in June and October. The St. Louis airport is a good distance from the courthouse and
you are well-advised to travel to St. Louis the day before rather than risk the impondera-
bles of air and ground transportation.
Sessions begin at 9:00 a.m., but counsel should report to the clerk's office no later than
8:30 a.m. If you have not been admitted to the court, that can be accomplished through
the clerk; forms will be provided by mail. A sponsor admitted to the court is required.
All cases are heard by three-judge divisions, 8TH CIR. R. 2(a), unless an en banc hearing
is ordered, FED. R. App. P. 35; 8TH Cm. R. 7, an increasingly rare occurrence. Unlike some
circuits, the Clerk of the Eighth Circuit Court will inform you which judges are hearing
a given case in advance of argument, but no earlier than the first of the month of the
argument. This enables you to concentrate upon opinions or dissents by those judges.
For a bibliography of extrajudicial writings by present members of the Eighth Circuit
Court, see note 256 infra. For a concise history of the federal courts in general and the
Eighth Circuit Court in particular, see Gibson, Some Observations on Our United States
Court of Appeals, 35 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 261 (1967).
30. See 8TH CIR. R. 2(d). See also Dranow v. United States, 310 F.2d 375, 375 (8th Cir.
1962) (per curiam) (court reluctant to extend time of filing briefs in criminal cases when
appellant is at liberty).
31. 8TH CIR. R. 10.
32. Id. 11A(1) (1977) (enacted pursuant to FED. R. App. P. 30(f)). An alternative
"deferred appendix" method, not adopted by the Eighth Circuit, permits counsel to
prepare and file an appendix after appellee's brief is filed. See FED. R. App. P. 30(c) (1977).
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ing, and transmitting a lengthy record and appendix. Appellate
counsel must, however, designate the portions of the record
"necessary" to the appeal, and the legal issues to be raised. 3
The Eighth Circuit has three requirements for briefs which
augment the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; although rel-
atively minor in themselves, noncompliance with them will be
glaringly conspicuous.34 First, a "preliminary statement" must be
included which identifies the judge from whom the appeal is
taken, cites any reported decisions below, and states the grounds
for jurisdiction below and in the court of appeals. 35 Second, an
alphabetical list of all cited authorities must appear after the
statement of each legal issue, with not more than four of the most
apposite authorities emphasized.3 6 Third, all briefs, including
those typewritten,37 must not exceed fifty pages.38 These direc-
tions are obviously to assist the court and violation of them will
annoy the judges 39 and announce that counsel has not acquainted
33. 8TH CIR. R. 11A(2) (1977). See also 8TH CIa. PLAN EXPEDrrE CRIM. App. IV(B)(2)
(1977). For a discussion of limiting the appellate record and selecting the issues, see notes
88-174 infra and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 251 F.2d 490, 493-94 (8th Cir. 1958) (counsel's
"flagrant failure to comply with rule of this court" resulted in the Eighth Circuit's refusal
to review trial court's ruling on evidence, although the court did review for plain error and
found none).
For an extreme example of noncompliance, see Robinson v. United States, 333 F.2d 323,
325 n.1 (8th Cir. 1964), quoted in note 179 infra.
35. See 8TH CIR. R. 12(b). For a more detailed discussion of the preliminary statement,
see notes 188-89 infra and accompanying text.
36. See 8TH Cm. R. 12(d).
37. The Eighth Circuit rules permit the filing of typewritten briefs in all criminal cases
and require only five photocopies. See id. liB. This spares the considerable expense and
time necessary for printing. See generally Willcox, Karlen, & Roemer, Justice Lost-By
What Appellate Papers Cost, 43 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 6 (1959).
38. This limitation was recently promulgated by the court and has not yet been pub-
lished. Cf. FED. R. App. P. 28(g) (principal briefs limited to 50 pages if printed, 70 if
typewritten). See also Smith v. Pollin, 190 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (110-page
brief exceeded court's 50-page limit; court dismissed appeal finding no injustice would
result), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 878 (1951).
39. The court is not unwilling to express its dissatisfaction with an errant attorney's
brief. In Lowe v. Taylor Steel Prods., 373 F.2d 65 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858
(1967), a products liability case, the court noted its disapproval of "plaintiffs flagrant
violation" of its rules requiring a concise statement of the case, a concise statement of each
point argued, and a printed argument. Before holding against the plaintiff, the court said:
These rules are reasonable, sensible, simple and plain. There is no reason why
they should not be complied with. The violations here would fully justify our
refusal to accept plaintiff's brief and summarily dismiss his appeal. Neverthe-
less, but not to be taken as precedent or policy, we have laboriously read the
entire record, and read and reread plaintiff's brief in an effort to ascertain his
assignments of error and the validity thereof.
19781
11
Nordby: The Craft of the Criminal Appeal
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
himself with the local rules or, what is worse, has simply not
bothered to follow them.
B. The Plan to Expedite Criminal Appeals
The Eighth Circuit's Plan to Expedite Criminal Appeals con-
tains detailed provisions governing preparation of the notice of
appeal, the designation of record and issues, and time limita-
tions. These requirements vary depending upon whether the evi-
dence was presented in three days or less,40 or more than three
days.4 In forma pauperis cases carry certain additional obliga-
tions . 2 A combination notice of appeal and transcript order form
is now provided to defense counsel at the time of the verdict.43
The explicit purpose of the Plan is "the disposition of criminal
cases. . . within a maximum of five months from the filing of the
notice of appeal to the rendition of the decision . . . ."" Accord-
ingly the Plan imposes time limitations substantially shorter
than those of the federal rules. 5 The court is quite serious about
expedition, and the clerk is required to notify the court of any
noncompliance." The court may "take any appropriate discipli-
nary action against any attorney . . . for failure to comply with
• . . [the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure] or any rule of
the court."47 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit reserves the right to
dismiss for failure to prosecute an appeal."' The local rules also
provide that the bond of an appellant released upon bail pending
appeal may be revoked "if appellate procedures are not timely
prosecuted . . . ."" With the trend toward speed in criminal
Id. at 67. See also Robinson v. United States, 333 F.2d 323, 325 n.1 (8th Cir. 1964), quoted
in note 179 infra.
40. See note 88 infra.
41. See 8TH CIR. PLAN ExPEDrrE CalM. App. IV(B) (1977).
42. See id. IV(A)(1); note 28 supra. See generally FED. R. App. P. 24.
43. See 8TH CiR. PLAN EXPEDITE CraM. App. IV(C)(1) (1977) (discussing appellant coun-
sel's duty to file the form).
44. Id. I. See generally note 25 supra (quoting objectives and priorities of the plan).
45. Compare 8TH CIR. PLAN EXPEDITE CalM. App. IV(C) (1977) with FED. R. App. P. 11
and id. 31. For the time limitations currently in effect in the Eighth Circuit, see the
timetable accompanying notes 62-87 infra.
46. See 8TH CIR. PLAN EXPEDrrE CalM. App. V(C) (1977).
47. FED. R. App. P. 46; see 8TH CIm. R. 13; 8TH CIR. PLAN EXPEDITE CRIM. App. V(C)
(1977). See also United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (court
imposed $2000 fine for counsel's failure to prosecute appeal which had put his client's right
to appeal in jeopardy).
48. 8TH CIR. R. 13.
49. Id. 10(e).
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appeals, and since courts are naturally hesitant to forfeit an ap-
pellant's rights by dismissing an appeal because of his lawyer's
neglect,50 it may well be that discipline of counsel will emerge as
a preferred means of enforcing the rules." Quite apart from the
ethical reasons for obedience,52 courts appreciate diligence, and
conspicuous compliance with time limitations is one of those
slight advantages an appellant cannot afford to be without.
The Eighth Circuit court is presently first among all the federal
circuits in expediting both civil and criminal appeals.5" It has the
shortest elapsed time for most stages of appellate proceedings;
one exception is the time between oral argument and final dispo-
sition,"4 due to the practice in some circuits, notably the Second, 55
of deciding some appeals immediately from the bench at the time
of oral argument. This occurs with extreme rarity in the Eighth
Circuit.
C. The Plan for Publication of Opinions
The Eighth Circuit court has provided that opinions will not
be published if the judges believe the decision has no precedential
value and if it affirms or enforces a judgment solely on the basis
that the evidence was sufficient or there was no legal error.5" An
opinion will probably be published if it includes a new interpreta-
tion of law, involves a matter of significant public interest, or
otherwise makes an appreciable contribution to the law. "7
50. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (impos-
ing fine on counsel rather than dismissing appeal). But see Smith v. Pollin, 190 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (overly long brief led to dismissal where no injustice would be
done), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 878 (1951).
51. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, several lawyers who have failed to prosecute
appeals have been subjected to fines. See, e.g., In re Morris, 521 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1975)
($300 fine); United States v. Birtle, 521 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1975) ($250 fine), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 947 (1976); United States v. Pearson, 476 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1973) ($100"fine).
52. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-5 provides: "A lawyer should have
pride in his professional endeavors. His obligation to act competently calls for higher
motivation than that arising from fear of civil liability or disciplinary penalty."
53. See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 283 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT].
54. Id.
55. 2D CIR. R. § 0.23 allows the court to promulgate the decision immediately from the
bench if the "decision is unanimous and each judge of the panel believes that no jurispru-
dential purpose would be served by a written opinion .... These decisions have little
precedential value. See Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501, 503 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1976);
United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. Compare 8T CIR. PLAN PUa. OP. (2) with 8TH CIR. R. 14.
57. See 8TH CIR. PLAN PUB. OP. (4).
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Unpublished opinions in the Eighth Circuit, which are clearly
marked as not for publication, may not be cited since they are not
uniformly available." Because you should always examine recent
slip opinions before submission of the brief and before oral argu-
ment to be certain your citations are current, be alert to this
admonition; the unpublished opinions appear among the court's
slip opinions.
Nonpublication does not reflect on the importance of the case,
but merely upon its lack of value as a precedent."9 Although the
client may believe he has been slighted, you might point out that
nonpublication also means that his name and transgression will
not be memorialized in the perpetuity of the Federal Reporter.'"
Judge Bright has described the process by which appeals are
screened to determine whether an oral argument or a full opinion
is justified or desirable:"'
All of the circuits-with the exception of the Second Circuit
which uses "affirmances from the bench" to cut short its work-
load-now employ so-called "screening procedures" in which a
panel of judges, and sometimes law clerks acting under judicial
supervision, gives a preliminary examination to the issues raised
in each docketed case in order to determine three things: (a)
whether there is any merit to the case at all, (b) if so, how
difficult a case it is, and (c) whether oral argument would be of
any value to its disposition. Based upon this evaluation, the
meritless case receives short shrift, and is subject to "summary
disposition," usually by a brief order or short per curiam opin-
ion. The case possessing merit is rated for full argument (30
minutes per side), limited argument (15 to 20 minutes per side),
or for nonargument. A nonargument case may be a difficult one
but is usually the sort of case where argument probably won't
assist the court. For example, it may be one where the court
58. See id. (3). But see Biebel Bros., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 522
F.2d 1207, 1212 n.1 (8th Cir. 1975) (judicial notice taken of an unpublished opinion "for
the sole purpose of clarification .... ").
59. See 8TH CI. PLAN PUB. OP. (1).
60. The unsuccessful appellate attorney similarly may have an interest in nonpublica-
tion. His name will not be printed in the official reporter; his loss not "permanently bound
for posterity." See Appleman, The Written Argument on Appeal, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW.
40, 48 (1965).
61. Bright, supra note 14, at 500 (footnotes omitted). Judge Bright also notes that of
all federal appeals afforded an oral argument, approximately one-third result in full,
signed opinions, one-third in per curiam opinions, and one-third in no written opinion.
Id. at 501 n.6.
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must examine the whole record to determine if substantial evi-
dence supports the trial court's decision.
D. Timetable for Criminal Appeals in the Eighth Circuit
The following time limitations are presently in effect in the
Eighth Circuit for the processing of criminal appeals." The
method of computing time is based upon the provisions of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 3 The day of the act or
event from which the period begins is not included and the last
day of the period is included unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday. 4 If the designated period is less than seven days,
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are not included in the
computation."
You should, of course, consult the latest versions of all applica-
ble rules before proceeding since time limitations are subject to
change.
Notice of Appeal and Transcript Order Form
The notice of appeal and transcript order form must be
filed in the district court within ten days from the date of
judgment, which is ordinarily the date of sentencing, or
within ten days from the entry of the appealable order.6"
62. The timetable is applicable only to criminal appeals. The time limitations in a civil
appeal are different, and therefore the relevant provisions in the federal and local rules
concerning civil appeals should be consulted.
63. See FED. R. App. P. 26 (1977).
64. See id. 26(a). Legal holidays include New Year's Day, Washington's Birthday,
Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiv-
ing, and Christmas. Any other holiday appointed by the President or Congress is also
included. State holidays are not included, except for the holidays of the state in which
the case arose and in which the principal office of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
located.
65. See id.
66. Id. 4(b). Although the district court may enlarge the time for filing the notice of
appeal for excusable neglect, see United States v. Wade, 467 F.2d 1226, 1227-28 (8th Cir.
1972) (mere permission from district court to file appeal held sufficient finding of excus-
able neglect to satisfy rule's requirement); FED. R. App. P. 4(b); the courts of appeal may
not enlarge the time. See United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960) (construing
predecessor to FED. R. App. P. 26(b)); FED. R. App. P. 26(b). Filing the notice is a jurisdic-
tional requirement without which the courts of appeal may not hear the case. See, e.g.,
Morin v. United States, 522 F.2d 8, 9 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Smith v. United States,
425 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Statement of Compliance with Plan to Expedite Criminal
Appeals
The statement of compliance with the Plan to Expedite
Criminal Appeals must be filed by the appellant in the
court of appeals within ten days after the filing of the
notice of appeal. 7
Appellant's Designation of Record and Statement of Issues
The appellant's designation of the record and statement
of the issues must be filed in the district court within ten
days after the filing of the notice of appeal.6 8
Appellee's Designation of Record and Statement of Issues
The appellee's designation of the record and statement of
the issues must be filed in the district court within ten
days after the appellant files his designation of the record
and statement of issues. 9
Docket Fee
The docket fee must be filed in the court of appeals within
the time fixed for transmitting the record or when ordered
by the clerk,70 which is always shortly after the filing of the
notice of appeal.
Transcript from Court Reporter
The transcript must be filed in the district court within
twenty days of the notice of appeal in cases where the
evidence was presented in three days or less,71 or within
forty days where evidence was presented in four days or
more.
72
67. 8TH CIR. PLAN EXPEDrrE CraM. App. V(A)(2) (1977).
68. Id. IV(B)(2).
69. Id.
70. FED. R. App. P. 12(a). The docket fee, and all other fees to be charged or collected
by the courts of appeal, must be uniform among the circuits. The Judicial Conference of
the United States has the authority to prescribe these costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1913 (1970).
No docket fee is required in appeals in forma pauperis, but appointment of counsel is
necessary in such cases. FED. R. App. P. 24.
71. 8TH CIR. PLAN EXPEDITE CRIM. Ap. IV(A)(3), IV(C)(4) (1977).
72. Id. IV(C)(4).
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Transmittal of Record to Court of Appeals by Clerk of District
Court
The record must be transmitted by the clerk of the district
court to the court of appeals within twenty-one days after
the notice of appeal has been filed,73 except that the clerk
of the district court must transmit the notice of appeal
and docket entries within twenty-four hours after the no-
tice of appeal has been filed."
Appellant's Brief
Appellant's brief must be filed in the court of appeals on
the date established by the clerk, not later than twenty-
eight days after the record has been filed. 5
Appellee's Brief
Appellee's brief must be filed in the court of appeals on
the date established by the clerk, not later than twenty-
one days after the appellant's brief has been filed.76
Appellant's Reply Brief
The appellant's reply brief, if any, must be filed with the
court of appeals within seven days after appellee's brief
has been filed." The reply brief is optional.7"
Oral Argument
The date and time of oral argument are set by the clerk.79
In criminal cases, the median time is presently thirty days
after the filing of appellee's brief."
Opinion
The goal of the Plan to Expedite Criminal Appeals is to
73. Id. IV(A)(4), IV(C)(3)(c).
74. Id. IV(C)(3)(a). The transmission of the notice of appeal and docket entries consti-
tutes transmission of the "record on appeal" under FED. R. App. P. 11(b), as construed in
the Eighth Circuit; the transcript is not considered a part of the record so defined.
75. 8TH CIR. PLAN EXPEDITE Ctmi. App. IV(C)(1)(c) (1977).
76. Id. IV(C)(2)(c).
77. Id. IV(C)(1)(c).
78. See FED. R. App. P. 28(c). For a discussion of the reply brief, see notes 267-69 infra
and accompanying text.
79. See FED. R. App. P. 34(a).
80. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 53, at 284.
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have the court's decision within five months after the fil-
ing of the notice of appeal,"' but the time of decision varies
greatly according to individual cases.
Petition for Rehearing
The petition for rehearing, if any, must be filed in the
court of appeals within fourteen days after the entry of
judgment. 2 The petition for rehearing is optional.83
Issuance of Mandate
The court will issue its mandate twenty-one days after the
entry of judgment, unless the mandate is stayed by a mo-
tion or by the filing of a timely petition for rehearing. 4 The
mandate will issue seven days after the denial of a petition
for rehearing and immediately upon a filing of a copy of
an order by the Supreme Court denying certiorari."
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
The petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed in the
Supreme Court within thirty days after the entry of the
Court of Appeals' judgment or its order denying a petition
for rehearing. 6 All inquiries concerning certiorari should
81. See 8TH Cui. PLAN EXPEDITE CRM. APP. 1 (1977). See note 44 supra and accompany-
ing text.
82. FED. R. APP. P. 40(a).
83. Id. For a discusssion of the general inadvisability of filing the petition for rehearing,
see notes 267-69 infra and accompanying text.
84. FED. R. APP. P. 41. If the defendant was released on bail by the district court, this
will ordinarily continue until after the mandate issues. Upon issuance of the mandate,
absent other orders or agreement, the district court will issue an order directing the
defendant to surrender for service of his sentence, usually a week or 10 days later.
85. Id.
86. SuP. CT. R. 22(2). No mailing period is provided for in the time allowed for filing
the writ, unless the case arose in a district court outside the contiguous 48 states, in which
case the writ will be deemed timely filed if it is airmailed within the time period. See id.
Otherwise, a petition must be received at the Supreme Court on or before the due date.
The Court has someone available 24 hours to receive papers.
SuP. CT. R. 22(2), however, is not jurisdictional and the Court may hear a case even if
the petition is received after the due date. See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S.
58, 63-65 (1970) (petition filed 101 days after period had expired was accepted because
petitioner had not caused delay). The Schacht Court stated: "The procedural rules
adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and
can be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion when the ends of justice so
require." Id. at 64. The courts of appeals do not have the same freedom. See note 66 supra.
Mailing time is allowed, however, in the circuit courts. See FED. R. APP. P. 25(a) (briefs
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be directed to the Clerk of the Supreme Court."
III. LIMITING THE RECORD
Except in cases where the evidence is heard in three days or
less,8" appellant's counsel must, within ten days after filing the
notice of appeal, designate "only those portions of the original
record and transcript of testimony necessary for a determination
of the appeal."89 This is important for several reasons, and you
should not designate all or most of the record simply out of cau-
tion. In consultation with government counsel, before filing the
notice of appeal,9" appellant's counsel should determine the parts
of the record to be eliminated.9 Ordinarily agreement will be
reached easily.
Limiting the record has these benefits: it saves the clerk the
time and considerable expense9" of producing unnecessary copies;
it forces you to analyze your strategy and focus the issues; and,
above all, it spares the court the necessity of reading transcripts
and documents with no bearing on the issues.93 Here, as in com-
pliance with other rules, the avoidance of court annoyance de-
serves careful consideration.94 In short, the record should contain
everything the court needs to know and see to understand the
issues, but no more. The designated record can be supplemented
deemed to have been timely filed on the day of mailing "if the most expeditious form of
delivery by mail, excepting special delivery, is utilized"); id. 26(c) (grants three additional
days for response to papers received by mail).
87. The Clerk of the Eighth Circuit will decline to answer questions regarding certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court Clerk may be telephoned at (202) 252-3012.
88. If the evidence is heard in three days or less, counsel does not have to designate the
"necessary" portions, but may order the entire record. This consists of the transcripts, the
notice of appeal, the docket entries, the indictment or information, any district court
memorandum or opinions, the judgment and sentence, and any other materials deemed
by counsel to be necessary. See 8TH Cm. PLAN EXPEDITE CRmI. APP. IV(A)(2) (1977).
89. See 8T CIR. R. 11A(2) (1977); 8TH CmR. PLAN EXPEDITE CRIM. APP. IV(B)(2) (1977).
90. The transcript must be ordered on the same form as the notice of appeal. See 8TH
CIR. PLAN EXPEDITE CRIM. APP. IV(C)(1)(a) (1977). See also id. IV(C)(2)(a) (requires
appellee's counsel to cooperate in preparation of the form).
91. FED. R. APP. P. 10(d) permits an alternate method of making an appellate record.
Although the practice is not widely followed, see Godbold, supra note 5, at 806-07, the
rule allows counsel for both sides to agree to a stipulated record. If the district court
approves the statement, the parties may process the appeal without the need for reproduc-
tion of the legal documents.
92. Currently 50 cents per page.
93. See Huxman, Preparation of a Case for Presentation to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, 25 KAN. CITY L. REV. 139, 139-41 (1957).
94. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 750 (8th Cir. 1967) (costs of supplemental
record filed by appellees not taxed against appellants), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
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by either counsel or the court when the need arises."
Certain items are always included in the record: the docket
entries; the indictment or information; any district court opin-
ions, memoranda, or orders challenged on appeal; the notice of
appeal; and the judgment and commitment." Pleadings which
define an appellate issue or confirm that it was raised and pre-
served should be included. For example, a written motion for
severance or for new trial should be included if those issues are
raised. Significant motions and rulings not directly related to an
appellate issue might be included to preserve a relatively com-
plete picture of the proceedings, or at least mentioned in the
statement of facts. Ordinarily the parties' memoranda of law are
not included.
As to the transcript, include only those matters which bear
directly or indirectly upon the appellate issues. Eliminate every-
thing else." Challenged evidence on the question of guilt must be
included if sufficiency of the evidence is raised or prejudice of an
error must be demonstrated. Testimony which is merely cumula-
tive or unchallenged should be eliminated. Frequently testimony
of experts" and mere foundation witnesses" is of this kind. Exhib-
its should not be designated unless they truly bear on the issues.
This is especially true of voluminous or dangerous exhibits; fire-
arms and drugs will never be transmitted unless the court re-
quests them.'""
Written requested jury instructions should be included only if
the court's instructions are attacked or have an indirect bearing
upon issues, such as where challenged evidence is stricken or its
application limited by instruction. If instructions are in issue, the
entire charge should be included because instructions must be
reviewed as a whole."
1"
95. See 8TH CIR. R. 10(d) (court may order additional transcript when abbreviated
record is used); 8TH Cm. PLAN EXPEDITE CaM. APP. IV(A)(2) (1977). See also FED. R. APP.
P. 10(e) (court may correct misstatement or omission by supplementing record).
96. See 8TH CIR. PLAN EXPEDITE CalM. APP. IV(A)(2), IV(C)(1)(a) (1977).
97. The court prefers to have counsel err by including too little rather than too much.
Additional items may be requested later if necessary. See note 95 supra.
98. For example, the lengthy and complicated testimony of a chemist, pathologist, or
fingerprint expert may have no effect save tedium if there is no dispute as to the type of
substance, the fact and cause of death, or the source of the print.
99. For example, the testimony of law enforcement officers establishing the chain of
possession of evidence or of custodians of records is generally not needed in the record on
appeal.
100. See FED. R. APP. P. 11(b).
101. See, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973); Boyd v. United States,
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If there were no objections to government counsel's opening or
closing arguments, they may be eliminated. But if one side's
argument is included, both should be, since objectionable re-
marks may have been invited or justified by adverse counsel's
argument. 02 The summations should be included if counsel
argued to the jury a point of challenged evidence, or conceded an
issue of proof and the sufficiency of evidence is challenged. Occa-
sionally the arguments may be useful to summarize the case for
the court.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide: "If determi-
nation of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules,
regulations, etc. or relevant parts thereof, they shall be repro-
duced in the brief or in an addendum at the end, or they may be
supplied to the court in pamphlet form."'' 3 Although the Eighth
Circuit rules allow criminal cases to be heard on the original
record,' '4 it is advisable to include items in the brief or addendum
if they are especially relevant, or require close scrutiny and re-
peated reference. For example, it may be helpful to reproduce a
challenged search warrant.
When in doubt, be guided by the important rule that will echo
like a refrain through this paper: Do what will be most helpful to
the court, to adverse counsel, and to yourself. Remember that the
record, the brief, and even the oral argument are not so much like
a lecture to be passively heard as like a set of keys to unlock the
mysteries of the case or a map to guide the court to the proper
destination. All the keys and signposts must be there, but remem-
ber the annoyance you experienced if you ever had to find the
correct key from a multitude of more or less similar specimens,
or follow a road on an outdated map or a map of too small a scale.
IV. SELECTION OF APPELLATE ISSUES
I said earlier that a criminal appeal is in many respects the
reverse of the trial. This principle bears some scrutiny as we
271 U.S. 104, 106-08 (1926); United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1302 (8th Cir.
1977); United States v. Cartano, 534 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 843
(1976).
102. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 281 F.2d 132, 136-37 (8th Cir.) (government
counsel's allegedly improper closing argument not reviewed because record did not include
all arguments), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 904 (1960). See also Donelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637 (1974) (effect on due process from a state prosecutor's improper summation).
103. FED. R. App. P. 28(f).
104. See 8TH CIa. R. 11A(1) (1977).
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examine what is perhaps the single most telling aspect of an
appeal: formulation of the issues.10 At trial the accused has the
presumption of innocence; the burden of going forward with proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is on the prosecution; nearly all ad-
vantages are to the defense. 06 Now, however, the appellant has
been convicted; the burden shifts to him; and the presumptions
favor the legal and factual determinations below.
Beyond these legal principles of appellate review, other obsta-
cles confront the appellant."7 Reversal is a painful and costly
business. It ordinarily requires a tacit or explicit finding that a
district judge, who is probably known to and respected by the
appellate judges, committed prejudicial error and abused his dis-
cretion, or that counsel for one or both sides committed deliberate
or negligent error. It means that time and expense will be spent
on a new trial and that a convicted criminal will either go free or
have another chance at his freedom despite a verdict of guilty.
Crime is unpopular with judges and their time is at a premium.
All of these are elusive but real influences, and trivial errors or
perfunctory argument will not overcome them. As a Georgia judge
said a century ago:1°8
The court erred in some of the legal propositions announced
to the jury; but all the errors were harmless. Wrong directions
which do not put the traveler out of his way, furnish no reason
for repeating the journey.
A true and effective selection of issues can only flow from a
mastery of the case-the record below and the applicable law. In
framing the issues, you are setting the ground rules and aligning
the forces before the reviewing court. It is only from knowing the
forces arrayed against you that you may most effectively formu-
late issues and position yourself to be in most effective control.
Only then can appellant's counsel, in Forster's phrase, "do what
105. Rufus Choate, the noted nineteenth century advocate, once said: "The best argu-
ment on a question of law is to state the question clearly." Littleton, Advocacy and Brief-
Writing, 10 PmRc. LAW. 41, 48 (Dec. 1964).
106. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
107. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADION 19 (1960) (lists, in addition to "the
American appellate judicial tradition," 14 other steadying factors in appellate decision-
making); Steinberg, supra note 8, at 6 (suggesting that appellate court "with its instinc-
tive desire to hold firm the bastions of organized society against harmful and antisocial
conduct" is counsel's greatest obstacle). See also notes 125-74 infra and accompanying
text (the four pitfalls in issue selection).
108. Cherry v. Davis, 59 Ga. 454, 456 (1876) (Bleckley, J.).
[Vol. 4
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss1/1
CRAFT OF THE CRIMINAL APPEAL
he likes.""'" Here are what I believe to be the most important
considerations in this process:
A. The Strength of the Evidence
Cases are rarely reversed for insufficient evidence because on
appeal the evidence is viewed most favorably to the verdict."' A
brief is only weakened by a spurious argument on the point.
At the same time, however, if the evidence is relatively weak,
that weakness should be emphasized in the statement of facts
and the argument. The impact of the argued errors will always
emerge more persuasively when the evidence is marginal."' Evi-
dentiary errors in particular will have more force when it can be
legitimately said that the erroneously received or excluded evi-
dence might have altered the result. Similarly, errors in jury in-
structions, the misconduct of counsel, and any other impropriety
in the presence of the jury will be more damaging when the evi-
dence is weak. Therefore, though you should be hesitant to argue
the insufficiency of the evidence as reversible per se, it is quite
proper to insist that errors be viewed more critically in a close
case.
B. Consolidation of Closely Related Issues
Issues should be consolidated. Proliferation of issues beyond
three or four passes the point of diminishing returns, burdening
the court with disparate arguments, fragmenting the attack, and
diluting the impact of all."2 Separate errors of a similar nature,
or closely related issues,"3 should be combined into a single coher-
ent argument with such subdivision as may be necessary.
109. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
110. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Reed,
446 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd second appeal per curiam, 461 F.2d 1106 (8th
Cir. 1972); Peterson v. United States, 411 F.2d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S.
920 (1969), aff'd second appeal per curiam, 467 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1972).
111. See, e.g., Lowe v. United States, 389 F.2d 108, 112-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 912 (1968); Patterson v. United States, 361 F.2d 632, 636 (8th Cir. 1966); note 143
infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the harmless error doctrine, see notes
125-43 infra and accompanying text.
112. Judge Bright writes: "In the criminal case, of course, counsel-especially ap-
pointed counsel-may have a constitutional obligation to raise all points of error. But even
there, raising a plethora of meritless claims of error reduces by comparison the strength
of other, more meritorious claims that he may have." Bright, supra note 14, at 504.
113. A good example is the improper receipt of evidence combined with either an
erroneous instruction regarding it or the prosecutor's comments upon it or both.
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The interrelationships among issues should be demonstrated as
forcefully as possible in an attempt to show that although errors
in isolation may not appear prejudicial, the cumulative effect is.
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,"4 for example, the Supreme Court re-
versed a murder conviction because of the overall effects of preju-
dicial publicity and the trial judge's handling of it-the "totality
of circumstances"" 5-not because of any single news story or indi-
vidual error.
Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote: "Due process is a growth too sturdy
to succumb to the infection of the least ingredient of error";", and
it is true that counsel disserves his cause by hyperbolic estimates
of the harm of insignificant error. Yet a violation of due process
need not fit any predetermined mold or parallel any previously
adjudicated error. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: "Repre-
senting as it does a living principle, due process is not confined
within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be
deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights."
'" 7
And, changing his metaphor from the elusive organic one to a
more famous and useful image, he wrote: "No single one of these
circumstances alone would in my opinion justify a reversal. I
cannot escape the conclusion, however, that in combination
they bring the result below the Plimsoll line of 'due process.' 11,,8
The Plimsoll line, or load line mark, is a mark on the side of a
ship which by its relation to the waterline demonstrates that the
vessel is or is not safely loaded." The image illustrates vividly the
fatal cumulative effect of individually tolerable errors.
The interaction of errors may also affect the type of relief avail-
able on appeal. In United States v. Frol,'2 0 for example, a narcot-
ics conspiracy conviction was reversed and remanded for judg-
ment of acquittal. The issues were only two: whether the incrimi-
nating out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator were impro-
114. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
115. Id. at 352; accord, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). But see, e.g., Murphy v.
Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 902-03 (8th Cir. 1975)
(reversal not warranted absent showing of prejudice from publicity), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
911 (1976); United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1365 (8th Cir. 1974) (no abuse of
discretion not to change venue when voir dire showed that the jury was unaffected by
publicity).
116. Roberts v. New York City, 295 U.S. 264, 278 (1935).
117. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.).
118. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 199 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
119. See WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1741 (1971).
120. 518 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1975).
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perly received in evidence; and whether the evidence was suffi-
cient without those statements to sustain the conviction. The
evidence was not overwhelming and thus the impact of the co-
conspirator evidence was fairly demonstrable. But to obtain the
reversal for judgment of acquittal, rather than merely a new trial,
it was essential to argue also the insufficiency of the evidence as
a matter of law.' 2'
C. Willful or Avoidable Error
An error should tend to be viewed more seriously if it appears
to have been deliberate or avoidable, because reversal will then
supposedly have a salutory deterrent effect and the rebuke im-
plicit in reversal will seem more deserved. Prosecutors' improper
questions or comments may fall in this category, 2 as may erro-
neous instructions where the proper instructions were requested,
supported by authority, and denied.
At the same time, however, appellate courts will not readily
condemn the trial judge or government counsel, 13 and you should
not make your work more difficult by requiring the court to find
misconduct as a prerequisite to reversal. Thus, while the deter-
rent effect of a reversal may be a legitimate and even attractive
concern, the attack should not be leveled at the judge or prosecu-
tor personally except in extreme or aggravated cases. The chal-
lenged actions should be so far as possible depersonalized, 124 with
121. See id. at 1138.
122. Reversal, however, is usually not warranted unless the misconduct deprived the
appellant of a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. McGrady, 508 F.2d 13, 20-21 (8th Cir.
1974) (although court had "misgivings" about propriety of prosecutor's reference to grand
jury proceedings in closing argument, the reference did not deprive appellant of a fair
trial), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975); McDonnell v. United States, 457 F.2d 1049, 1052-
53 (8th Cir.) (prosecutor's remark, although deserving of censure, was not grounds for a
new trial), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 860 (1972); Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 735-39
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962).
The reason for this rule was suggested in United States v. Miranda, 556 F.2d 877, 880
(8th Cir. 1977) where the Eighth Circuit court said: "The trial court can best control the
course of arguments and is in position to weigh the mischief of improper argument."
123. In United States v. Porter, 441 F.2d 1204, 1213 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
911 (1971), the court said: "When comments of the trial court exceed the boundaries of
fair discipline by official disparagement of counsel or of a litigant's case, then error must
follow." The Porter court reviewed the record and determined that the case presented was
a "strong" case against the defendants and therefore the error complained of was not
sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. 441 F.2d at 1213-16.
124. See, e.g., Anderson v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 156 F.2d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 1946)
(civil suit) ("A brief should not contain language disrespectful to the court nor to opposing
counsel and ordinarily a brief containing such scurrilous and scandalous matter should
19781
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the emphasis upon the damage to the defendant and the prospec-
tive benefits of reversal.
D. The Four Pitfalls: Common Doctrinal Obstacles to Success
on Appeal
Quite apart from the merits of the issues presented-some-
times, indeed, despite the conceded correctness of the appel-
lant's position-the courts have fashioned a number of devices
for avoiding reversals. Among these, four deserve individualized
comment because they are common, they are foreseeable, and
in some cases they can be disarmed or evaded; in other cases
they will dictate abandonment of an issue. A great many appel-
late arguments are vulnerable to their undermining force, and
each issue should therefore be tested against them.
1. The Harmless Error Doctrine
Few if any trials are altogether free of error, yet few errors result
in reversals. Without doubt the commonest reason for this is the
"harmless error" doctrine. Much has been written on the sub-
ject;"' indeed few principles seem closer to the appellate judge's
heart. It is a seductively simple phrase, and it means in practice
pretty much what it says: "Any error, defect, irregularity or vari-
ance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disre-
garded. '2 1 But it is a principle more easily described than ap-
plied, for notoriously it is impossible to determine, or even to
inquire into, what processes of thought or debate led to a jury
verdict. 127
Some constitutional errors are per se harmful, such as the use
in evidence of a coerced confession; 12 deprivation of counsel at
be stricken from the files."); Smith v. Simpson, 140 F. 712 (8th Cir. 1905) (brief "marked
by contemptuous references" to lower court was stricken from files "in order that such
practice may not seem to be sanctioned or encouraged"). See generally F. WIENER, supra
note 18, § 83(d), at 258-61.
125. See, e.g., R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970); Kornstein, The
Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1976); Saltzburg, The Harm of
Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988 (1973).
126. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). The rule reiterates the principle set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
2111 (1970), which applies specifically to appellate courts. See also FED. R. CRIM. P.
7(c)(3) (1977) (application of the rule to defects in indictments).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 620-21 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 926 (1975); United States v. Blackburn, 446 F.2d 1089, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972).
128. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964); Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 513-18 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1963).
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trial' 9 or at a critical pretrial proceeding;'10 trial by a judge whose
pay is contingent upon the result;'3 ' trial in a community whose
jurors are exposed to prejudicial publicity;'32 denial of a speedy
trial;3 3 conviction by a jury instructed with an unconstitutional
presumption against the accused;' 34 and purposeful racial dis-
crimination in the selection of grand or petit jurors.' 35 But this
rule of "automatic reversal"1 36 will seldom be found applicable on
appeal because such errors, being so clearly proscribed, do not
often occur and, when they do, probably result in mistrials.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that constitutional er-
rors may be harmless. Chapman v. California'3 7 is the key deci-
sion and reading it is indispensable to an understanding of the
harmless error doctrine. Under a California constitutional provi-
sion explicitly authorizing the practice, the prosecutor in
Chapman commented extensively upon the defendant's failure to
testify. The Court held that this practice violated the defendant's
rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments,1 39 but it con-
cluded that "there may be some constitutional errors which in the
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant
that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be
deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the
conviction."' 39
Mr. Justice Black then undertook to fashion criteria and a
method for applying this rule. Once a constitutional error in re-
ceiving inadmissible evidence is established, the question, he
wrote, is "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evi-
129. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942).
130. See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam); Hamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
131. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
132. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-52 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 541-44 (1965). But see Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) (suggesting that actual
prejudice must be proven).
133. See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973) (per curiam).
134. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1946). See also Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973) (instruction that "[e]very witness is presumed to speak
the truth" does not, when considered as a whole, negate the presumption of defendant's
innocence).
135. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1967).
136. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 45 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
137. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
138. Id. at 20-21. The Court had held similar comment to violate the defendant's
constitutional rights in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
139. 386 U.S. at 22.
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dence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."'' "
Lurking in this question is the first crucial characteristic of the
harmless error rule: to decide if an error contributed to the result,
the reviewing court clearly must put itself in the position of the
jury, expose itself to every factor which led to the verdict, im-
merse itself in "the totality of the circumstances" of the trial.'
This permits, indeed requires, appellant's counsel to return to the
more congenial terrain of the trial courtroom, to recreate the con-
geries of errors, irregularities, and evidentiary weaknesses that
led to the result.
Moreover, and perhaps most important, once a constitutional
error is shown, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that it was harmless."' Consider the
significance of this presumption against harmlessness. It allows
the appellant, in effect, to regain the edge he enjoyed at trial. It
may afford an even greater advantage here because the prosecu-
tion must prove a negative: that there is no reasonable possibility
the error affected the result.
Appellate review of nonconstitutional errors, of course, pro-
ceeds differently. The appellant has the burden of showing the
error and its harmful effect, and an error "which in a close case
might call for reversal may be disregarded as harmless where the
evidence of guilt is strong."'' If an error is not clearly constitu-
tional, appellate counsel should have an eye upon the malleable
concept of due process of law; a record devoid of constitutional
errors may, nevertheless, in its totality, deny due process. And is
not any error that is reasonably likely to have affected the result
a probable denial of due process, therefore a constitutional error
and (because of its effect on the result) harmful?
140. Id. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
141. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) ("Our judgment [on the ques-
tion of harmless error] must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems
to us to have been the probable impact of the . .. [error] on the minds of an average
jury."); Reed v. Wolff, 511 F.2d 1369, 1370 (8th Cir. 1975) (same); see Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333, 335-57 (1966).
142. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
143. Lowe v. United States, 389 F.2d 108, 112 (8th Cir.) (quoting Garner v. United
States, 277 F.2d 242, 245 (8th Cir. 1960)), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 912 (1968). Or, as the
Supreme Court put it in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953): "In view of
the fact that this record fairly shrieks the guilt of the parties, we cannot conceive how this
one admission could have possibly influenced this jury to reach an improper verdict. A
defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."
[Vol. 4
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2. Errors Not Preserved in the Court Below
Another distressingly common rationale for affirmance is the
widely applied rule that the reviewing court will refuse to enter-
tain issues not raised in the court below.'" This principle penal-
izes the defendant for the lapses of his lawyer, without regard to
the justice of the result, and as such it makes little sense.' Yet
few rules of appellate review are so well-established and counsel
must be prepared to come to terms with it. There are principally
two ways to avoid its impact in proper cases.
First, there is the "plain error" rule, which provides that "plain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed al-
though they were not brought to the attention of the court."'"6
Plain error is no easier to define than harmless error. Calling an
error plain, of course, does not make it so. There is no explicit
requirement that a plain error be of constitutional dimension; but
conversely, even constitutional errors are not necessarily plain
errors." ' To be noticed, an unpreserved error must ordinarily be
both obviously wrong and obviously prejudicial,'4 8 and if it is, it
will probably amount to a denial of due process.
One of appellate counsel's more difficult chores is to search the
record for errors unnoticed in the trial court; the serious appellate
lawyer will never limit his reliance to the motions and objections
made by trial counsel. 9 In most cases reviewing courts will refuse
to consider unpreserved errors, or dispose of them summarily. 150
In fact, the courts cannot even agree whether notice of plain error
is mandatory 5' or discretionary.' Nevertheless an appellate law-
yer has not acted competently unless he has detected, by the
144. See, e.g., Levitt v. United States, 517 F.2d 1339, 1347 (8th Cir. 1975); Brennan v.
Maxley's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 184 (8th Cir. 1975).
145. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
146. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
147. See, e.g., Shaw v. United States, 403 F.2d 528, 530 (8th Cir. 1968); Robinson v.
United States, 327 F.2d 618, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1964).
148. E.g., United States v. Guerrero, 517 F.2d 528, 531 (10th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Brown, 508 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1974) (overruled on other grounds in United States
v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 44 n.9 (8th Cir. 1975)).
149. This conclusion applies even when trial counsel is appealing the case.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughan, 443 F.2d 92, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1971).
151. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 464 F.2d 542, 543 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972), second appeal dismissed per curiam, 489 F.2d 703 (5th Cir.
1973).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 542 F.2d 879, 883 (2d Cir. 1976); United States
v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1965) (en banc).
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antennae of research and experience, every act and omission in
the proceedings leading to the conviction which violated a right
and may have contributed to an unjust result.
Indeed the second vehicle for transporting a previously un-
noticed error to the appellate court is the sixth amendment; trial
counsel's ineptitude or inaction may amount to a denial of effec-
tive assistance of counsel. Errors in this category might also be
raised by collateral attack either after appeal or instead of it.,"3
Traditionally, the test for evaluating the performance of trial
counsel for sixth amendment purposes has been whether the trial
was a "farce" or a "mockery of justice."'' 4 This standard is both
unfair to the client and an insult to the legal profession, however,
for it is far below the level of competency clients deserve and by
which lawyers ought to be measured. Moreover, the standard
tends to do injustice because reviewing courts understandably
hesitate to malign trial lawyers and trial judges for participating
in mockeries of justice.
Another questionable criterion for sixth amendment violations
is the "lawyer's deliberate abdication of [his] ethical duty to his
client.' 1 55 Whether the lawyer was malevolent or merely inept has
little relation to the justice of the individual case, and no public
policy seems to require or justify the distinction.'
The Eighth Circuit has recently reviewed and reformulated its
approach to the question in a series of opinions, beginning in 1974
with Chief Judge Gibson's observations in Johnson v. United
States:"'
A more appropriate nomenclature for the standard would be to
test for the degree of competence prevailing among those li-
censed to practice before the bar. The standard would refer more
precisely to the professional competence of one who has com-
pleted a long and arduous course of study for a professional
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
154. E.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974), vacated second
appeal on other grounds, 537 F.2d 976 (8th Cir. 1976); Cardarella v. United States, 375
F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967).
155. Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971); accord, Lyles v.
United States, 346 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd second appeal per curiam, 362
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 952 (1966).
156. As Lord Devlin wrote in Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd., [1957] 2 Q.B. 1,
17-18: "If a person wakes up in the middle of the night and finds an escaping tiger on top
of his bed and suffers a heart attack, it would be nothing to the point that the intentions
of the tiger were quite amiable."
157. 506 F.2d 640, 646 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975).
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license, and who has acquired some experience in applying legal
principles and conducting court trials.
More recently, Judge Lay concluded in United States v. Easter:,'
As we perceive the standard established in our prior decisions
it is that trial counsel fails to render effective assistance when
he does not exercise the customary skills and diligence that a
reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar cir-
cumstances.
This is both a fairer and a more workable approach. The truly
significant improvement is that appellants now have a reasonable
expectation of obtaining review of errors which their trial counsel
failed to raise, without showing that the latter was an utter in-
competent or a scoundrel. It is, in effect, a new willingness to
apply a harmless error test to actions of any trial lawyer whose
performance falls perceptibly below reasonable competence; re-
versal still will not result unless the defense was "materially
prejudiced."'59
The unpreserved error, then, should not be automatically ig-
nored, but it should only be raised where the error is quite clear
and the prejudice fairly demonstrable.
3. The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine
Reviewing courts may also avoid confronting an issue by appli-
cation of the concurrent sentence doctrine. It was recently stated
concisely by Judge Henley for the Eighth Circuit court in Sanders
v. United States:6 0
The concurrent sentence rule . . . is that where a defendant
receives concurrent sentences on plural counts of an indictment,
and where the conviction on one count is found to be good, a
reviewing court need not pass upon the validity of the defend-
ant's conviction on another count or on other counts if a ruling
in his favor would not reduce the time that he is required to
158. 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976), af/'d second appeal, 552 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1977);
accord, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) ("reasonably competent advice"
required).
159. Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1975). The phrase
"materially prejudiced" is probably redundant, but the very redundancy reveals some-
thing of the court's attitude.
160. 541 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977). For an authori-
tative explication and history of the rule, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787-93
(1969).
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serve under the sentence imposed with respect to the valid con-
viction.
Strictly applied, this would mean that any appeal would be
fruitless if any one count is invulnerable to reversal. Fortunately
the rule is not always invoked, but is used at the discretion of the
reviewing court.''
Judge Henley, continuing in Sanders, describes two exceptions
to the rule's operation: "[lit should not be applied in cases
where its application would be substantially prejudicial to a de-
fendant or expose him to a substantial risk of adverse collateral
consequences that might flow from an invalid but unreversed
conviction.'
6 2
The first exception, prejudice to the defendant, seems clearly
to contemplate a possible effect upon the trial result: "whether
it was likely that evidence relevant to counts on which the de-
fendant was improperly convicted affected the finding of guilt
on another count or on other counts ... ."I" The concurrent
sentence doctrine and the exception for prejudice is thus in
effect also a species of the harmless error rule. Like that rule, it
invites counsel to argue the totality of the circumstances leading
to the convictions, and the interrelationships among errors, to
demonstrate prejudicial error.
The second exception to the doctrine arises where there are
"collateral consequences" from the unreversed conviction. These
include the effect upon the thinking of the sentencing judge, even
where the total sentence does not exceed that authorized for a
single valid count; the effect upon the place and conditions of
confinement; and the future use of the invalid conviction as a
"prior conviction" under a recidivist statute.'64 Other adverse
consequences include the effect upon parole eligibility,' the for-
161. E.g., United States v. Holder, 560 F.2d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 1977); Sanders v. United
States, 541 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
162. 541 F.2d at 193.
163. Id. at 194; De Pugh v. United States, 401 F.2d 346, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1968) (valid
count remanded for new trial because of adverse effects from evidence produced on two
invalid counts).
164. Sanders v. United States, 541 F.2d 190, 194 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1066 (1977).
165. The court in United States v. Holder, 560 F.2d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 1977) has stated:
"Until recently, we have lacked evidence that applying the concurrent sentence rule would
influence parole status decisions. It now appears that the United States Board of Parole's
regulations for determining parole eligibility necessitate a reassessment of that doctrine."
For a list of parole criteria used by the federal parole board, see 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976),
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feiture of civil rights or privileges,' and the greater social stigma
of some convictions.
4. Discretion and Its Abuse
Reversal of any conviction will reflect adversely to some degree
on the trial judge, who made the fatal error or failed to correct
it. One of the greatest impediments to success on appeal is the
respect and deference which appellate judges have for their col-
leagues on the trial bench."7 Federal district judges have a great
deal of discretion in practically all phases of trial proceedings," 8
and reversals will not result from discretionary rulings unless
appellate counsel can demonstrate an "abuse" of discretion.
Inevitably appellate judges are hesitant to condemn trial judges
for abusing their positions, since that terminology carries with it
connotations of either ignorance or deliberate violation of estab-
lished rules. It is similar in this respect to plain error, although
the latter term is more often used in connection with nondiscre-
tionary acts.8 9
The traditional test for abuse of discretion is illustrated in this
formulation: "[D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable
man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable
men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the
trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its
discretion." 170 This is a stringent standard indeed, one that would
be serviceable as an equivalent of the plain error test. It presup-
poses a finding, in fact, that the trial judge was not a reasonable
man. Only with trepidation and as a last resort would counsel
undertake to persuade an appellate court of that.'
as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 12,045 (1977), as amended by id. at 31,786, as amended by
id. at 44,234, as amended by id. at 52,399.
166. See generally Survey of the Law-Civil Disabilities, 23 VANI. L. REv. 941 (1970).
Lawyers, for example, will ordinarily be disbarred for convictions of felonies or crimes
involving moral turpitude, but not necessarily for others. E.g., Note, Non-Professional
Conduct Demonstrating Unfitness to Practice, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 489, 490-91 (1958).
167. E.g., Steinberg, supra note 8, at 10-11. Judge Jerome Frank even suggests that the
trial judge sit with the reviewing court on the hearing of an appeal. See J. FRANK, COURTS
ON TRIAL 252-53 (1950).
168. See, e.g., Cline v. United States, 395 F.2d 138, 142 (8th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Holt, 108 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 672 (1940).
169. See text accompanying notes 146-52 supra.
170. Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).
171. Indeed "abuse" of "discretion" may be self-contradictory, since discretion is by
definition the right to act according to one's own judgment. But let us not further compli-
cate the question.
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Fortunately, another line of cases recognizes a "more generous
standard of review," ' well expressed by Judge Magruder of the
First Circuit in In re Josephson:'"
"Abuse of discretion" is a phrase which sounds worse than it
really is. All it need mean is that, when judicial action is taken
in a discretionary matter, such action cannot be set aside by a
reviewing court unless it has a definite and firm conviction that
the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.
This is a much less perjorative and intimidating standard, and
you will enhance your chance of reversal for an abuse of discre-
tion if you can first persuade the appellate court that it is the
correct standard. Reviewing judges are more likely to find that
a trial judge made an error of judgment than that he was arbi-
trary, fanciful, and unreasonable.
Finally, an exceptionable exercise of discretion, like any other
error, will more likely lead to reversal in a "close" case, for preju-
dice will be more probable than where the evidence is overwhelm-
ing.'74 A candid evaluation of the strength of the evidence will
therefore be necessary before you decide upon the wisdom of al-
leging as error a discretionary act.
Only after you have mastered the record can you perceive the
issues; only after you have measured those issues against the
foregoing criteria, and done the necessary research into the law,
can you design the structure of the brief. Your approach to both
the statement of facts and the arguments will be dictated by the
surviving issues. I turn now to some important aspects of the
preparation of the brief itself.
V. THE BRIEF
A good brief will be more than the sum of its parts. When the
issues are well-chosen and well-phrased, when the brief is for-
mally correct and concise, "5 when the facts are fully and fairly
stated,' when the arguments are forceful and to the point, " and
when relief appropriate to the case is sought,' each aspect of the
172. Finley v. Parvin/Dohrmann Co., 520 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1975).
173. 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954).
174. See Osborne v. United States, 351 F.2d 111, 117-18 (8th Cir. 1965).
175. See notes 181-215 infra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 216-25 infra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 226-40 infra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 241-46 infra and accompanying text.
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brief will lend force to the others. Conversely, an overly long,
careless, unfair, or inaccurate brief will sap the appellant's legal
arguments of whatever inherent force they may have.
The briefs immediate impressions on the judge are critical. For
good or ill, the first impression, the final impression, the lasting
impression of the case will often spring from the appellant's brief.
The brief must persuade, and it will not persuade if it is read
incompletely or grudgingly. It should be long enough to tell the
judge everything he needs to know about the record and the law
to decide the appeal, without being redundant, superfluous, or
laboring the obvious." 9 Yet it should be short enough to be read
without tedium, boredom, or annoyance.1'0
A. The Brief Must Be Formally Correct, Terse, Just, and
Entertaining
1. The Formal Requirements of the Brief
It may be useful to begin with a description, in the form of a
checklist, of the parts of an appellant's brief as prescribed by the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and modified by the Eighth
Circuit's rules. Practices vary greatly from circuit to circuit and
the identical configuration would not be appropriate in any other
jurisdiction.
,The Cover of the Brief
The cover of the appellant's brief should be blue; the cover
of the appellee's brief, red; and the cover of the reply brief,
179. In Robinson v. United States, 333 F.2d 323, 325 n.1 (8th Cir. 1964), the court
remarked: "Counsel for appellants has filed the most inept, maladroit and unfit brief that
has ever been our lot to peruse. It covers less than 4 typewritten pages and is destitute of
legal acumen or any attempted compliance with our cited rules. Such conduct warrants
reprimand." In any event, the brief must not exceed 50 pages. See note 38 supra and
accompanying text.
180. In Thys Co. v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 219 F.2d 131, 133 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 946 (1955), the court gave vent to its annoyance at appellants' briefs:
The examples given above are merely illustrative of the generally disordered,
confused, and confusing presentation characteristic of both of appellants' briefs.
The purpose of the requirements in respect of briefs is to conserve the time and
energy of the court and clearly to advise the opposite party of the points he is
obliged to meet. These purposes were not served here. We may add that
throughout the briefs - and the oral argument as well - appellants' counsel
displayed a tendency to philosophize, to dwell upon what he thinks the deci-
sional law . . . ought to be rather than what it is. Such arguments may be
interesting but they are not helpful to the court.
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gray. ' The cover should indicate the name of the appel-
late court and that court's number of the case; the title of
the case as styled by the court below; the identity of the
appellant; the nature of the proceeding (such as appeal);
the name of the court below; the title of the document
(such as "Brief for Appellant"); and the name and address
of counsel submitting the brief."2 Although not required
by the rules, the name of the judge below may be indi-
cated.
The Table of Contents
The table of contents should have references to the pages
in the brief where each part is located.1 3 It is helpful to
include the argument headings to give the court an imme-
diate reference to the issues. The table should be detailed
enough to serve as an index to the brief.
The Table of Authorities
This table refers to the location in the brief where each
authority is cited. Cases, statutes, and other authorities
should be listed separately, and alphabetically ar-
ranged. 184
The Statement of Issues
1
8
5
In the Eighth Circuit the statement of issues'8 presented
for review must be followed by a citation of all authorities
relied on in the argument on the point. The cases consid-
ered most apposite, but not more than four, must be un-
derscored.8 7 This requirement obviously makes it desira-
ble to have the issues correspond to the arguments, al-
though the issues and argument headings need not be
identical.
181. See FED. R. App. P. 32(a).
182. See id.
183. See id. 28(a)(1).
184. Id.
185. The statement of issues is required by FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(2). For a discussion
on the selection of issues most likely to result in reversal, see notes 105-74 supra and
accompanying text.
186. Stating the issues on appeal is the one aspect of appellate practice "most usually
botched by counsel." Prettyman, supra note 16, at 287.
187. 8TH Cm. R. 12(d).
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The Preliminary Statement
A preliminary statement is required in the Eighth Cir-
cuit.1ss It must include the name of the judge from whom
the appeal is taken, citation of any reported decisions or
memoranda by the judge pertinent to the appeal, and the
grounds on which jurisdiction below and in the court of
appeals was invoked, together with a citation to the statu-
tory provisions and time factors upon which jurisdiction
rests. ' 9 For example, a preliminary statement in a crimi-
nal appeal by the defendant might state that jurisdiction
of the district court was invoked by indictment; that juris-
diction of the court of appeals is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure; and that jurisdiction depends upon the filing of the
notice of appeal within ten days after judgment under
Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Statement of the Case
The statement of the case should indicate briefly the na-
ture of the case, the course of the proceedings, and the
disposition below. 90 For example, it might state that the
appeal is from a conviction for a conspiracy in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371, after a trial by jury, for which appellant
was sentenced to five years imprisonment.
The Statement of Facts9'
The statement of the facts should include the facts rele-
vant to the issues. Appropriate references to the record
should be given to support each fact stated. 9 ' Because no
appendix is required in the Eighth Circuit,'93 references
must be to the original record and should adequately iden-
tify the part, such as the particular motion, document, or
the specific page of the transcript."' Cited documents and
188. See id. 12(b).
189. Id.
190. See FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(3).
191. For a discussion on preparing the statement of facts, see notes 216-25 infra and
accompanying text.
192. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(3).
193. See 8TH CIR. R. 11A(1). See also notes 103-04 supra and accompanying text.
194. When several transcripts of different proceedings are involved, be certain to iden-
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transcripts must, of course, have been included in the des-
ignation of the record. If there are multiple volumes of
transcript, it will be helpful to list volume and page, and
even more helpful to refer to folio numbers for specific
references. When the admissibility of evidence is chal-
lenged, reference must be made to the pages of the tran-
script at which the evidence was identified, offered, and
received or rejected.' 5
The Argument "'
The argument, of course, contains the legal contentions of
appellant, with citations of authorities and parts of the
record relied upon. 9 ' It may be preceded by a summary of
the argument.'
The Conclusion
The conclusion should be stated separately and must in-
clude the precise relief sought, 9 such as a new trial or
remand for judgment of acquittal. The relief demanded
should be appropriate to the errors. 00 It may be desirable
to summarize the argument in the conclusion, particularly
where the case is complex and it is necessary to tie loose
ends together. The conclusion is the final written word in
your presentation and it should be designed to leave a
lasting and convincing impression of the rightness and the
inescapability of the result prayed for.
The Reproduction of Statutes, Rules, and Regulations
Statutes, rules, and regulations which are required for a
determination of the issues should be included either in
the brief, an addendum to the brief, or a separate pam-
phlet.20'
tify the reference specifically such as "Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress" or
"Transcript of October 17."
195. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(e).
196. For a discussion on preparing the arguments, see notes 226-40 infra and accompa-
nying text.
197. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(4).
198. Id.
199. Id. 28(a)(5).
200. For a discussion on the selection of appropriate relief, see notes 241-46 infra and
accompanying text.
201. FED. R. APP. P. 28(0.
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Compliance with these formal requirements is presupposed in
an effective brief. The finer points of brief-writing, to some of
which we now turn, will be of little use if you have alienated the
judge by inattention to formal detail.
2. Be Terse, Just, and Entertaining
We lawyers tend to overestimate the relative magnitude of our
own cases. Perhaps it must be so to command the full attention
each case deserves. It may help to comprehend the role of a brief,
however, to reflect that for the appellate judge it is only one of
several he must consider on a given day, one of many in a week.
When, for example, five cases are set for argument, ten briefs will
be involved, as well as five records. So a brief faces the twin
dangers of being so slight and unmemorable that it is lost in the
crowd, or so long and tedious that it remains in memory only as
an imposition upon the harried judge's time.02 An acute sense of
a rapidly approaching point of diminishing returns should con-
stantly terrorize the brief writer.
Prose style cannot, of course, be taught or learned quickly. To
a considerable extent it is subjective, and to be effective it must
be either natural or extremely well-practiced. There are a few
suggestions, however, which can be briefly stated and can have
prompt and lasting benefits.
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote that an effective advocate
will master the short Saxon word that pierces the mind like a
spear and the simple figure that lights the understanding. He
will never drive the judge to his dictionary. He will rejoice in the
strength of the mother tongue as found in the King James ver-
sion of the Bible, and in the power of the terse and flashing
phrase of a Kipling or a Churchill. m
Unfortunately, we are tempted by the sesquipedalian word, per-
haps as a badge of the extent of our learning or the solemnity of
our mission. We end often enough by trading in jargon and hack-
neyed elaborate expressions which are stripped of force by over-
202. Judge Bright again: "If you don't keep constantly in mind the notion that your
case is just one of hundreds of others on the court's crowded docket and if you don't tailor
your briefs to take into account this crucial fact of appellate life, you will be wasting your
time and your client's money." Bright, supra note 14, at 501.
203. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case
Preparations, 37 A.B.A.J. 801, 863-64 (1951).
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use or sheer density. 04 A simple and familiar word or phrase is
not always better than a more arcane expression, but it usually
is. The word that appears to have come from a Thesaurus should
probably have been left there.
Yet I would not be understood to promote simplemindedness.
The fresh word or phrase that rings precisely true will attract the
reader's respect and appreciation if he values good writing. The
words "sesquipedalian" and "arcane" above were, for example,
chosen with care; although neither is common, both will be
known to most literate readers, and I do not believe any simpler
or more familiar terms would convey as directly and completely
the meaning I want. The proper use and true value of a Thesau-
rus, used in conjunction with a dictionary, is to find the most
specifically correct word among near-synonyms. This section of
this article asserts that a brief must be terse, just, and
entertaining. Those terms, too, were chosen carefully to convey
very specific meanings.
"Terse" means "neatly or effectively concise . ."101 Thus it
means something more than such apparent synonyms as
"concise," "brief," "short," "condensed" and so on.201 "Succinct"
is perhaps the next best word, but it is rather less familiar, lacks
the specific element of effectiveness, and has one more syllable
than "terse." "Terse," in a word, is terse. (Perhaps I should con-
cede that "sesquipedalian" is sesquipedalian.) For the brief as a
whole to be terse, each part of it must be: the issues, facts, and
arguments. And for these to be terse, each part of them must be:
each paragraph, each sentence, each word. But I repeat: Mere
brevity and simplicity of language is not enough; it must be
effectively brief. The Gettysburg Address, that perennial model
of terse expression, °0 is short, but it is not simple; it attains force
in part from uncommon expressions and the cadences of multisyl-
labic words which would not be improved by shorter or simpler
diction: "Four score and seven (eighty-seven?) . . . conceived in
liberty (born in freedom?) . . . dedicated to the proposition (de-
204. See generally J. APPLEMAN, PERSUASION IN BRIEF WRITING 64-73 (1968). Valuable
guides to improving one's prose are W. FoLLuEr, MODERN AMERICAN USAGE (1966); W.
STRUNK & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (2d ed. 1972); W. ZINSSER, ON WwrrITo
WELL: AN INFORMAL GUIDE TO WRITING NONFICTION (1976). For a few examples of genuinely
egregious legal prose, see Godbold, supra note 5, at 814-15.
205. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1466 (1973).
206. RoGEr's INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 451 (4th ed. 1977).
207. See note 5 supra.
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voted to the idea?) . . . we cannot dedicate, we cannot conse-
crate, we cannot hallow (any one of the foregoing?). . . the brave
men, living and dead (what other kinds are there?) . .. .08
Among other things, Lincoln deliberately used repetition effec-
tively and without conveying a sense of redundancy: the words
"dedicate" or "dedicated" appear five times; "we cannot," and
"the people" three times; "conceived," "consecrate," "devotion"
and "we are met" twice each; all in a speech of less than three
hundred words.
I mention this not to encourage imitation of Lincoln's repetitive
structure and purposely archaic phrases, but to emphasize that
brevity and simplicity, though virtues, are not always most effec-
tive in themselves. But when in doubt, use the simpler, more
familiar word or phrase.
I say next that a brief must be "just," a word defined as
"guided by truth, reason, justice, fairness . "... -0 Although
"fair" is given as a synonym, it is defined somewhat differently
to include: "free from bias. .... ,10 Since a brief is an advocate's
document it will not be free from bias. Therefore "just" is a
slightly more precise word in our context than "fair." Of course
if a brief is unreasonably biased, its persuasive force will be
quickly undone by adverse counsel's rebuttal, if not by the judge's
own insight and view of the record. The statement of issues, the
statement of facts, and the argument headings, it is true, may be
'designed to persuade to their point of view, but they must also
be balanced to accomodate damaging facts and authority.
21'
Finally, a brief should entertain. This word was chosen not to
suggest such synonymous verbs as "amuse," "divert," or
"regale, ' ' 2 but precisely its preferred meaning: "to hold the at-
tention of agreeably .... '1211 That definition splendidly conveys
what I have been insisting upon: the readability of the brief, the
quality of seizing the judge's attention and holding it agreeably;
that is, by being pleasant, without producing annoyance, bore-
dom, anger.
208. Lincoln had used the phrase "eighty-odd years since" in a speech a few months
earlier. 2 C. SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINcoLN 469 (1939).
209. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 775 (1973).
210. Id. at 511.
211. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-106 (B)(1) (duty to disclose
adverse legal authority); id. EC 7-23.
212. See RoGET's INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 685 (4th ed. 1977).
213. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 476 (1973).
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As Justice Cardozo wrote: "The search is for the just word, the
happy phrase, that will give expression to the thought, but some-
how the thought itself is transfigured by the phrase when
found." ''1 It has been my experience that a helpful preparation
for writing good prose is to read some."'5
B. The Statement of Facts Should Be Persuasive But Accurate
Meticulous attention should be given to the statement of facts.
It is probably the most important part of the brief,2 16 and cer-
tainly the part where you can be most creative. The law comes
as written by the legislatures and judges; it is not for us to rewrite,
modify, or generally even to paraphrase the law.217 But the facts
come raw, often in the form of inarticulate and unsequential testi-
mony and exhibits. Here you can and should be creative, not in
distorting or misrepresenting the evidence, of course, but in mar-
shalling it in the manner that most effectively describes the issues
and their context, and supports the legal positions taken in the
arguments to follow. The statement of facts should convey to the
judge the events that gave rise to the prosecution, what took place
at the trial, and in that context, what went wrong to require a new
trial. It should not contain a recitation of the legal issues as such,
but from it the issues should emerge in a manner leaving little
doubt as to how they should be resolved.
The mission of the statement of facts has been well stated by
Professor Llewellyn:
2 11
It is. . .a question of making the facts talk. For of course it is
the facts, not the advocate's expressed opinions, which must do
the talking. The court is interested not in listening to a lawyer
rant, but in seeing, or discovering, from and in the facts, where
sense and justice lie.
. ..It is trite that it is in the statement of the facts that
the advocate has his first, best and most precious access to the
214. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 89 (1924).
215. A good anthology is both a protean pleasure and useful in this respect. One of the
best is C. BLAKE, H. ENGLISH, A. HOWES, R. LENAGHAN, L. McNAMARA, & J. ROSIER, THE
NORTON READER (1969).
216. E. RE, supra note 18, at 126-28; F. WIENER, supra note 18, § 23, at 44.
217. See, e.g., Thys Co. v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 219 F.2d 131, 133 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 946 (1955).
218. Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and Advocacy - Especially in
Commercial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 167, 183-84 (1946) (footnote omitted) (em-
phasis in original).
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court's attention. The court does not know the facts, and it
wants to. It is trite, among good advocates, that the statement
of facts can, and should, in the very process of statement, frame
the legal issue, and can, and should, simultaneously produce the
conviction that there is only one sound result. It is as yet less
generally perceived as a conscious matter that the pattern of the
facts as stated must be a simple pattern, with its lines of sim-
plicity never lost under detail; else attention wanders, or (which
is as bad) the effect is submerged in the court's effort to follow
the presentation or to organize the material for itself.
Although the structure and sequence of the statement of facts
will be dictated by the circumstances of the case, some general
principles might be noted. The chronology of the criminal episode
and its aftermath should usually be followed rather than the chro-
nology in which witnesses testified and exhibits were received., 9
The order of proof at trial is frequently disjointed and confusing.
One of the appellate counsel's chief services to the court is to
impose order and clarity on this chaos. The facts should be stated
so far as practicable to correspond to the order of the arguments,
to simplify cross reference.
The parties should be identified by name and not merely as
appellant or appellee,220 particularly when several appellants are
involved, so that it is immediately apparent on whose behalf a
point is being made. The principal actors in the drama should be
humanized, by including descriptive characteristics when they
are available and helpful. This is especially true of the accused,
unless he emerges as an unmitigated scoundrel. Tell the court of
his youth or age; his illness or sobriety; his blameless life if he had
one; his family, employment, schooling, or whatever the record
contains to remind the judges that they are dealing with a real,
feeling, human being capable of suffering and, being human, cap-
able of error, and deserving of forgiveness."' Government counsel,
219. See F. WIENER, supra note 18, § 25, at 48.
220. See FED. R. App. P. 28(d) (specifically discouraging use of "appellant" and
"appellee" to describe parties on appeal). The confusion in criminal cases, however, is less
likely than in complex, multilitigant cases, because criminal cases typically involve only
one appellant. See also M. PITTONI, BRIEF WRITING AND ARGUMENTATION 30-31 (3d ed. 1967)
(suggesting methods of designating the parties on appeal).
It is strongly recommended in Doherty, A Few Suggestions for Handling Criminal
Appeals, 27 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 124, 126 (1969), that an appellant not identify a com-
plaining witness as the "victim" because of the sympathy the word invites.
221. This should be done with great economy, however, for the relevance of it is usually
slight.
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of course, may do the same for any victim.
Relevant conflicts in evidence and missing items of proof
should be clearly identified. Do not leave the court with the task
of comparing a recital of one witness' testimony with that of
another, or of searching for faults in the proof. Undisputed or
unimportant matters should be eliminated or treated briefly. If,
for example, a chemist, pathologist, or fingerprint expert testified
at length, but his findings are not challenged on appeal, do not
review the testimony, simply state the uncontroverted fact estab-
lished.
Interesting and individualizing aspects of the case may be use-
ful even if they are not directly pertinent. Widespread public-
ity,12 lengthy jury deliberations, 23 requests for additional instruc-
tions,224 and other things may reflect a tenor of the trial favorable
to the appeal, by showing that the case was close and the errors
harmful.2 5 The facts and law in a criminal case are usually inher-
ently interesting and often fascinating, involving as they do mur-
der, narcotics, fraud, robbery, rape, escape, infidelity, gam-
bling-the very stuff that thrillers, tabloids, motion pictures, and
much literature are made of. There is no need to drain these
exciting events of all dramatic appeal simply because they are
being treated in a legal document. In a sordid case, of course, it
may be in the appellant's interest to de-emphasize the more egre-
gious evidence and give an antiseptic treatment of the facts. This
should be attainable without dull or turgid prose.
C. The Arguments Should Be Forceful and to the Point
If the facts and issues have been properly stated, the court will
know precisely what questions must be resolved. The argument's
222. See notes 114-15, 132 supra and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Brotherton, 427 F.2d 1286, 1289 (8th Cir. 1970) (in
holding that jury deliberation for roughly five to seven minutes was not a denial of due
process, the court said: "There would be more reason to suspect something was wrong if
the jury had taken an inordinate length of time in a case such as this, as . . . one might
surmise that the individual will of one or more members might have yielded to the
pressure of the other jurors.").
224. See, e.g., Batsell v. United States, 403 F.2d 395, 396-400 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1094 (1969). See also Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896)
(not error for judge to instruct potentially hung jury that if the majority of them are of
one opinion, the minority "ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably
doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority");
Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 552-54 (8th Cir. 1969) (Allen-type instruction not
coercive).
225. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
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function is simply to identify the controlling authorities (statutes,
rules, decisions, policy reasons), and demonstrate why they com-
pel the relief prayed for. The argument must be forceful without
hyperbole; concise without being cryptic; and complete without
superfluity."8 As Judge Bright puts it: "Go for the Jugular."2"
An argument must argue. It must persuade the court to adopt
a position which is ordinarily directly contrary to that taken by
the trial judge.2  This will require not only the identification of
error, but the demonstration of its prejudice. Overstatement
should be avoided; it simply creates an obstacle to credibility.
Rarely will a court perceive the imminent crumbling of the entire
edifice of western jurisprudence in the overruling of an objection
or the denial of a motion. The effect of the error in its context
should be identified, and related to the specific relief sought.2
1
The court must be persuaded why and how a new trial will be a
better one and do substantially more justice than the challenged
trial did.
The argument should begin with an argument heading, 30 pre-
ferably in capitals or underscored, which summarizes the argu-
ment and forcefully asserts the brief's position.2 31 Usually a single
226. In Couch, Writing the Appellate Brief, 17 PRAc. LAW. 27, 29 (Dec. 1971), a practical
reason for getting to the point is offered: "[Wihile the judge who writes the opinion may
carefully study your brief, the other judges read it rather hurriedly. So your brief must
catch their attention and invade their thought processes. A rambling, disjointed brief
cannot accomplish this."
227. Bright, supra note 14, at 504 (emphasis in original).
228. Justice Cardozo reminds counsel that appellate judges are "hardened sinners, not
easily redeemed." B. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in LAW AND LrrERATURE 37-38 (1931).
Another writer points the way to redemption:
The successful argument must be one which makes the reader want to believe.
Something warmer than the cold science of logic is needed to achieve this pur-
pose. Logic may be a means of showing the reader that his preconceived ideas
may have been wrong; but this is not enough. A man convinced against his will
is of the same opinion still. Persuasion must create a desire to believe.
F. COOPER, WRITING IN LAW PRACTICE 24 (1963) (emphasis in original).
229. See notes 241-46 infra and accompanying text.
230. See F. WIENER, supra note 18, at § 30. But see Godbold, supra note 5, at 810 n.23
(lArgumentative headings] do nothing for me. Rather I resist the notion that I can be
affected to any meaningful degree by the semantics of a heading. Argumentative headings
generate counter-arguments, and then the judge must settle this side controversy in his
own mind in order to identify the real controversy.").
231. Justice Cardozo has written:
Often clarity is gained by a brief and almost sententious statement at the outset
of the problem to be attacked. Then may come a fuller statement of the facts,
rigidly pared down, however, in almost every case, to those that are truly essen-
tial as opposed to those that are decorative and adventitious. If these are pre-
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sentence will serve this purpose best. It should be an argumenta-
tive restatement of the issue presented, the latter being a more
neutral statement of a general principle of law. If there are subis-
sues, arguments should also be subdivided.
The argument is not a treatise, a law review article, or a judicial
opinion and therefore it should not be a discursive review broader
than necessary for resolution of the issues.131 It should be to the
point, bearing in mind that the readers are a group of judges who
have a sound background in the major principles of law, but who
are not clairvoyant, and are not immersed as you are in the de-
tails of your case. Avoid dwelling on the obvious, but do not
neglect to identify the pertinent facts, the precise issues, the ap-
posite authority, and the relations among them.
Authorities should be selected carefully and cited sparingly.2 33
If there is a controlling decision, a decision nearly in point, or a
dispositive statute or rule, the focus should be there. The Eighth
Circuit's requirement that four or fewer of the most pertinent
authorities be underscored24 may be seen as a benchmark for the
maximum number of decisions which will ordinarily deserve close
scrutiny for any argument. But do not rely on four if three, two,
or one will do. One genuinely apposite case is always more per-
suasive than two or more cases slightly on point.
235
The most pertinent cases should be discussed, not merely cited.
A properly discussed case should not have to be read by the court,
even though it will be read. The facts which make cases similar
to or distinct from the case on appeal should be identified and the
precise holding stated. Cases should not be quoted at length or
frequently, but a brief quotation of decisive language is often
forceful and preferable to paraphrase. Quotation also adds vari-
ety to the appearance of a page.2 3
sented with due proportion and selection, our conclusion ought to follow so
naturally and inevitably as almost to prove itself.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 228, at 33.
232. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 94 (1959).
233. Marshall, The Federal Appeal, in COUNSEL ON APPEAL 151 (A. Charpentier ed.
1968).
234. See 8TH CIR. R. 12(d) (1977).
235. If several citations are legitimately needed, for example to show authority for a
point in several jurisdictions, place them in a footnote so the flow of the argument is not
halted and the reader does not have to search for the resumption of the text.
236. Jean Appleman devotes an entire chapter in her book, PERSUASION IN BRIEF
WRITING 90-118 (1968), to quotations suitable for inclusion in any brief.
[Vol. 4
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The relative weight of judicial opinions depends upon the tri-
bunals in which they were decided. As a general rule, the follow-
ing order of preference in federal criminal appeals is probably
correct: United States Supreme Court decisions; decisions from
the circuit in which the appeal is brought; other federal circuits'
decisions; decisions from federal district courts, state courts, and
foreign tribunals; and finally the observations of commentators
and secondary authorities. More recent authority, of course, is
stronger than older decisions. The force of secondary authorities
will depend very heavily upon the stature of the author and the
persuasiveness of his reasoning. Always search out the most perti-
nent and recent decisions of the court in which you are appearing,
even when there is a Supreme Court decision on point. Shepard's
Citations should be consulted in addition to the slip opinions.
37
The Eighth Circuit Clerk has available a most helpful quarterly
index of that court's decisions.
Because one function of a brief is to assist the court in its own
research, it may be helpful to point out secondary research aids
such as annotations, key numbers, law review articles, treatises,
and other basic tools, though these will rarely if ever be relied
upon as authorities. Usually they are most appropriately placed
in a footnote and identified as aids to research rather than author-
ities.28
Adverse cases must be dealt with, not ignored. A brief which
237. The benefit to be derived from using SHEPARD'S CITATIONS can best be illustrated
by a story told in L. STRYKER, supra note 16, at 222-24. Mr. Stryker was arguing an appeal
on behalf of a doctor who had had his license suspended after having hired an individual
not licensed to practice medicine in New York. Opposing counsel had cited a case in his
brief which went directly against Stryker's client. By using SHEPARD'S, Stryker discovered
that the unfavorable decision had been reversed on appeal to a higher court. In oral
argument, Stryker equated the opposing counsel's error in failing to check SHEPARD'S with
his own client's failure to check the credentials of the man he had hired, and won the
appeal.
238. Do not, however, use footnotes excessively, because "[ylou are not writing a
scholarly law review article that is expected to be filled with long, tortuous footnotes."
Couch, supra note 226, at 30.
Among the sources most useful in doing research for federal appeals are the following:
E. DEvrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (3d ed. 1977) (three
volumes; indispensable on questions involving jury instructions in the Eighth Circuit);
LAWYER'S CO-OPERATIVE PUB. Co., AMERICAN LAW REPORTS; 8-8B MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1977) (three volumes on criminal rules); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES (1966) (six volumes); WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1976); WEST PUB.
CO., MODERN FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST (federal decisions according to the key number
system); 1-3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1969) (three volumes on crimi-
nal rules). See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS (Approved Draft 1970).
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fails to cite a case against its position will appear to lack candor,
a more damaging characteristic than the adverse case itself. In-
deed, there is an ethical obligation to cite contrary authority."9
If the contrary case is altogether decisive, it may well mean the
issue should be abandoned. Only with extreme rarity should a
court be expected to consider overruling its own decisions, and
then only for very good reasons such as a wealth of later authority
from other jurisdictions, amendment of legislation, or a manifest
change in circumstances. 4 ' More often the task is to distinguish
the harmful case, and most cases are distinguishable from one
another.
Do not be intimidated into immediate surrender by adverse
authority or lack of any authority. If the pertinent statutes or
decisions seem to be against you, but seem to lead to injustice in
your case, your client may deserve to have you take a pioneering
step toward change, especially if the previous authorities are old.
You will be fortunate if your case promises to be a good precedent
for the future. Do not be concerned with "making bad law." You
have one client at a time; to be less than complete in your zeal
for his cause because you foresee ill-effects on others in the future
would be to have a conflict of interest. But bear in mind that the
court will be concerned with the future consequences of its deci-
sion, and will not readily fashion a decision that promises absurd
ramifications. Which is only to say, in another way, that the relief
sought should be tailored precisely to the case.
It bears repeating that the argument must above all demon-
strate why the error requires reversal of the case at hand. Do not
239. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1) (failure to disclose
to tribunal contrary authority may be grounds for disciplinary action); id. EC 7-23.
240. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (court noted that 22
states joined as amici curiae to support overruling); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)); Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S.
495, 496-97 (1958) (per curiam) (reversal of prior decision not warranted when Congress
could change effect of decision by legislation); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78
(1938) (court notes that prior rule had placed an intolerable burden on litigants which
"rendered impossible equal protection of the law"). See generally Blaustein & Field,
"Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 151 (1958); Douglas, Stare
Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. Rav. 735 (1949). See also Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Wisdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late. Since I now realize
that I should have joined the dissenters in [an earlier case], I shall not compound error
by pushing that decision still farther."); Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611,
639-40 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I see no reason why I should be consciously wrong
today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday.").
[Vol. 4
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beg the crucial question, which must cross appellate judges'
minds with frustrating frequency as they read and hear of alleged
violations of broad principles, and which I suspect only courtesy
prevents them from voicing in so many words: "So what?"
D. The Relief Sought Should Be Appropriate
The relief sought should be appropriate to the errors alleged. 4,
A new trial is most common, a new trial without the error that
tainted the previous one. 22 When the evidence is insufficient as
a matter of law, or where the statute of limitations has run, a
dismissal or judgment of acquittal might be ordered.2 43 If the
reviewing court vacates a conviction of one offense but affirms as
to another, particularly if the latter carries a lighter sentence, or
if an illegal or excessive sentence was imposed, the relief may be
remand for resentencing.2 4 If the record on an issue is inadequate,
the prayer might be to remand for further proceedings in the trial
court.2 45 If new and apposite decisional or statutory law has been
promulgated since the conviction, the case may be remanded for
reconsideration in light of that authority.
2 6
Whatever the situation, the proper relief should be requested,
and the fairness of the relief should be shown. An order for a new
trial, for example, would not require that the defendant be set
free, and would ordinarily be a small price to pay for correction
of an injustice. Remember that reversal is the first prerequisite,
but appellate counsel must think beyond to the next step as well;
if the court agrees to reverse, what then?
VI. THE ORAL ARGUMENT
It is widely agreed by appellate judges and lawyers that oral
241. See FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(5) (requiring statement of precise relief sought).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 472 F.2d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Jacques, 463 F.2d 653, 659 (1st Cir. 1972).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Frol, 518 F.2d 1134, 1137-38 (8th Cir. 1975); Drennon
v. United States, 393 F.2d 342, 344 (8th Cir. 1968) (court saw no purpose in remanding
for further proceedings and thus reversed "outright"). See also Strunk v. United States,
412 U.S. 437 (1973) (dismissal is the only remedy for denial of a speedy trial).
244. See, e.g., Gentry v. United States, 533 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1974). See also Robinson v. United States, 333
F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1964) (court of appeals itself reduced the sentence).
245. See United States v. Kitchen, 488 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1973).
246. See, e.g., Schleis v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 3839 (U.S. June 27, 1977) (No. 76-
5722) (United States Supreme Court grants certiorari and remands for reconsideration in
light of recent decision).
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argument is an important, and sometimes the most important,
part of an appeal." 7 Yet many oral presentations lose much of
their force from improper design and poor presentation, because
counsel has not understood his true r6le at this juncture."8 Just
as an appeal is not a retrial of the case below, an oral argument
should not be a mere recitation of the briefs. The oral argument
is a chance to underscore the most significant aspects of the par-
ties' positions, and, much more importantly, to answer questions
which remain after the briefs have been read.
2 4
1
247. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 14, at 507 ("I would say that, in about 25 percent of
the cases, the oral argument makes a personal difference to me in the way I view the
case."); Clark, Foreword to M. PITrONI, BRuEF WarriNG AND ARGUMENTATION vii-viii (3d ed.
1967); Cutler, Appellate Cases: The Value of Oral Argument, 44 A.B.A.J. 831 (1958); cf.
SuP. CT. R. 45(1) (court "looks with disfavor on the submission of cases on briefs, without
oral argument").
If the recommendations proposed in P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 17 (1976) were adopted, oral argument would play an ever-increasing
role in appellate practice. The authors regret the current tendency of the courts to de-
emphasize oral argument by reducing the time allotted to it and by eliminating it in some
cases. They state:
Oral argument is important as a means of giving judges a continuing awareness
of their relationship and dependence on others; without it, the judge is isolated
from all but a limited group of subordinates. It is an important assurance, both
in fact and in appearance, that decisions are made collectively, because it is the
occasion when all judges responsible for the decision address themselves to-
gether and in the public view. Oral argument gives to litigants the assurance
that the judges themselves are making the decisions. And it also gives litigants
the sense of participation which is an essential of the adversary tradition.
Id. at 17-18.
It is the brief which those authors feel is taking too much of the courts' time. See id.
at 27. In simple appeals, the authors urge that oral argument be the sole method of
communication to the court, other than a short written statement of the issues and a
sparse selection of authority. Id. at 28.
The Eighth Circuit, like other courts, screens cases for those not requiring oral argu-
ment. This does not reflect the court's opinion of the merits of the case, but merely a belief
that oral argument will not assist their decision. For a description of the screening process,
see Bright, supra note 14, at 500.
248. Justice Marshall writes:
All the lawyers I know, especially those who have written on advocacy, stress
the importance of oral argument. Most judges do, too. I suspect that those who
don't have become so inured to the poor arguments that are often made that
they do not appreciate the value of oral arguments in general. During a few
arguments in the Second Circuit, I've recalled with approval the remark in King
Henry VI, Part II, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."
Marshall, supra note 233, at 144.
249. Judge Bright writes:
Oral argument serves two purposes: it gives the lawyers a chance to present
their theory of the case in a nutshell, and it allows the judges to ask questions
to clear up any doubts that the court might have about the case or the lawyer's
approach to it.
Bright, supra note 14, at 506.
[Vol. 4
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The oral argument is transitory and its impact often ephem-
eral. Unlike the brief, it does not remain in tangible form as the
judge ponders the case.25 Because it is a live, personal confronta-
tion designed to explore the most diffit ult questions in the ap-
peal, however, the oral argument can and should create a lasting
impression upon the court.2"' If you can convey an image of in-
formed conviction in the rightness of your position, and satisfy
any voiced reservations about your arguments, you can cement
the structure which the brief has erected. If you are disorganized,
disrespectful, or indifferent, you will certainly undo whatever the
brief may have accomplished. Because the oral argument requires
compression into a very short time of all the important issues of
the case, and often involves unpredictable questions by the court,
it is in some respects a lawyer's highest challenge. It can give
occasion for his finest moments, or his worst. The culmination of
a long series of serious events, it should be viewed as nothing less
than the last word which can be spoken on behalf of a client for
whom very much is at stake.
A. Preparation of the Oral Argument
Wiener lists nine essentials of an effective oral argument:252
(a) Appreciation of the purpose of advocacy.
(b) Not reading the argument.
(c) Application of the fundamentals of good public speaking.
(d) An effective opening.
(e) Clear statement of facts.
(f) Complete knowledge of the record.
(g) Thorough preparation.
(h) Attitude of respectful intellectual equality.
(i) Flexibility.
In many respects the last of these, flexibility, is the most impor-
tant. In federal appeals, the court will almost always have numer-
250. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit tape record the
argument to enable a replay by the judges if they wish. See E. RE, supra note 18, at 174.
251. Some judges even prefer to hear oral argument before reading the briefs to obtain
their first impression of the case. In federal courts, however, this is probably the exception
rather than the rule. See Godbold, supra note 5, at 817 n.40; Marshall, supra note 233, at
145-46. See generally Gates, Hot Bench or Cold Bench: When the Court Has or Has Not
Read the Brief Before Oral Argument, in COUNSEL ON APPEAL 107-34 (A. Charpentier ed.
1968).
252. F. WIENER, supra note 18, § 92, at 280. See generally id. §§ 93-102 (detailed
examination into each of the nine essentials of effective oral argument).
19781
51
Nordby: The Craft of the Criminal Appeal
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
ous questions directed incisively toward the decisive issues and
the weak points in the briefs. Thus it is best to prepare the oral
argument from a devil's advocate's point of view, searching out
one's own weaknesses and anticipating the most probing ques-
tions in order to prepare the most effective answers.
Frequently time limitations will prevent argument of all the
issues.253 Select those on which you believe oral comment will be
most effective and prepare a presentation that will fill the allot-
ted time. Mark distinctively the points you want to be certain to
make even if questioning prevents your full presentation. Prepare
thorough notes on all other issues in anticipation of any questions
likely to arise.
A written narrative argument should usually not be prepared
and certainly not read. 254 Questioning ordinarily prevents this in
any case. The most effective method of notation is probably an
outline of the facts and arguments as set out in the brief. Sub-
notes should include citations to important cases and places in
the record so you do not have to search the briefs or the transcript
for references. The record itself should be tabbed so that all im-
portant references are readily at hand if the court asks about
them.2 55 A thorough knowledge of the record together with a
method for ready access to it will save time, accent the argument,
and favorably impress the court with your preparedness. Lack of
these things will be correspondingly conspicuous and harmful.
Besides digesting, annotating, and tabbing the record, you
should have copies of decisive opinions. The judges who wrote,
253. The local rule provides for the appointment by the Chief Judge of a panel of judges
to screen cases for classification into one of three categories: (1) cases requiring a full 30-
minute argument per side; (2) cases requiring an abbreviated 20-minute argument per
side; and (3) cases requiring no oral argument. See 8m Cm. R. 6 (1977). Counsel may
request the court to reclassify the case. The large majority of cases in the Eighth Circuit
are presently being accorded 20-minute arguments. For a description of the Eighth Cir-
cuit's screening method, see Bright, supra note 14, at 500.
254. FED. R. App. P. 34(c) ("Counsel will not be permitted to read at length from briefs,
records or authorities."); cf. SuP. CT. R. 44(1) ("The court looks with disfavor on any oral
argument that is read from a prepared text.").
Lawyers who read from a prepared text have probably forgotten that oral argument is
a method of communication to the court. "One would hardly attempt to persuade a traffic
officer not to write a ticket or his next door neighbor to give up his Super Bowl seats by
reading a prepared speech to him." Lascher, Oral Argument for Fun and Profit, 48 CAL.
ST. B.J. 398, 400 (1973). See also Gates, supra note 251, at 111-12 (same analogy to the
persuasion of a "pretty young thing").
255. See generally Fitzgerald & Hartnett, Effective Oral Argument, 18 PRAc. LAW. 51,
55 (Apr. 1972) (discussion of tabbing an index).
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joined in, or dissented in the important cases should be noted;
you may be arguing before one or more of the same judges. Unlike
the practice in some courts, the Clerk of the Eighth Circuit will
disclose in advance of argument which judges are sitting, thus
occasionally giving you the opportunity to focus on the views on
specific issues of the judges before whom you argue.25
256. But the composition of the panel will be disclosed no earlier than the first day of
the month in which the argument is to be heard. See note 29 supra.
Judges, of course, express themselves other than in written opinions. Below is a biblio-
graphy of publications by the present members of the Eighth Circuit Court, alphabeti-
cally arranged by title for each member:
Judge Myron H. Bright: The Changing Nature of the Federal Appeals Process in the
1970's, 65 F.R.D. 497 (1975); Future Case Note: The Economy Versus The Environment,
53 N.D. L. REv. 319 (1977).
Chief Judge Floyd R. Gibson: Crime and the Courts, 40 U. Mo. K.C. L. REv. 285 (1972);
Some Observations on Our United States Court of Appeals, 35 U. Mo. K.C. L. REv. 261
(1967).
Judge Gerald W. Heaney: Dean William B. Lockhart: On His Retirement, 56 MINN. L.
REv. 990 (1972); The Minnesota and National Labor Relations Acts - A Substantive and
Procedural Comparison, 38 MINN. L. REv. 730 (1954) (co-authored with Robert Latz).
Judge J. Smith Henley: Admission of Attorneys to Practice Before Federal Administra-
tive Agencies: An Analysis and Recommendation, 24 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 1198 (1957);
Admission to and Control of Practice Before Federal Administrative Agencies, 19 OHIo ST.
L.J. 400 (1958).
Judge Donald P. Lay: Book Review, 45 IOWA L. REv. 962 (1960) (reviewing D. PIERSON,
THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY AND BASIC DEMFSE TACTICs (1958)); Commencement Address, 46
N.D. L. REv. 269 (1970); Dedication: Robert Van Pelt, 49 NEB. L. REv. 507 (1970); Delayed
Effects of Soft Tissue Injury, 1959 TRIAL & ToRT TRENDS 87; Depositions, 42 NEB. L. Rxv.
382 (1963); Discovery Practice in Wisconsin, 1954 Wis. L. REv. 428; Double Recovery for
Medical Payments by Personal Injury Claimant, 21 INS. COUN. J. 461 (1954); How Old Are
You - Mr. Insured?, 20 INS. COUN. J. 40 (1953); A Judicial Mandate, 7 TRIAL 14 (Nov.-
Dec. 1971); The Law and Its Credibility Gap, 5 TRIAL 37 (Aug.-Sept. 1969); The Medical
Legal Proof of Cervical Nerve Root Irritation, 1957 TRIAL & TORT TRENDS 448; Modern
Administrative Proposals for Federal Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Prisoners Preserved,
21 DE PAUL L. REv. 701 (1972); Oral Argument on Appeal - "Where the Action Really
Is", 63 F.R.D. 508 (1974); Post Conviction Remedies and the Overburdened Judiciary:
Solutions Ahead, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 5 (1970); Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus
Involving State Prisoners, 45 F.R.D. 45 (1969); Reconciling Tradition with Reality: The
Expedited Appeal, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 419 (1976); Seminar for Oklahoma Judges: De-
monstrative Evidence, 34 OKLA. B.J. 1902 (1963); Service Personnel - Invalid Restric-
tive Endorsement on Liability Insurance Policy, 1959 TRIAL & TORT TRENDS 505; States'
Rights: The Emergence of a New Judicial Perspective, 22 S.D. L. REv. 1 (1977); Strains
on the Quality of the Judicial Process, 36 ALA. LAW. 144 (1975); Suggestions for Plaintiff's
Practical Uses of Discovery Techniques, 9 PRAc. LAW. 43 (Dec. 1963); Suing for Damages
Because of Injury to Another, 5 PRAc. LAw. 65 (Oct. 1959); A Trial Lawyer Speaks to the
Investigator, 2 PRAc. LAW. 69 (Jan. 1956); The Use of Real Evidence, 37 NEB. L. REv. 501
(1958).
Judge Charles J. Vogel: Judges of the Facts, 34 N.D. L. REv. 308 (1958).
Judge William H. Webster: Bank Charge Cards - Recent Developments in Regulation
and Operation, 26 Bus. LAW. 43 (1970); Chairman's Report: Corporate Business and Bank
Law, 33 Bus. LAW. 1 (1977); Fiduciary Responsibility: Questions and Answers, 31 Bus.
53
Nordby: The Craft of the Criminal Appeal
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Just before argument, the authorities cited should be brought
to date, including a perusal of the court's most recent slip opin-
ions at the courthouse the morning of argument. At least several
weeks will elapse between the submission of the briefs and the
argument; pertinent decisions may well have come down in the
interim. To avoid reading citations during argument, it is good
practice to prepare a list of later decisions in writing and provide
them to the clerk either before or after argument. This should not,
however, be an additional brief, but merely citations to truly
applicable intervening decisions.
B. Presentation of the Oral Argument
It scarcely need be said that you must show respect and defer-
ence to the judges and opposing counsel at oral argument..
2 7
Strive for Wiener's "attitude of respectful intellectual equal-
ity."2 uHumor is not necessarily out of place, but it probably has
to be spontaneous to be effective, and little is to be profited from
an attempt to program humor into your presentation .2  Be cau-
tious to avoid sarcasm or the appearance of sarcasm, which is
incompatible with respectfulness.
Remembering that overstatement will be its own undoing, it
does not follow that the argument need be emotionless. And sim-
ply because you must respect the judges does not mean that you
must agree with their comments. Questions from the bench are
usually designed either to test a weakness or underscore a
strength, as the judge may see it. Do not assume that a judge
asking difficult questions is predisposed against you; just as often
he will be testing the validity of his agreement with you.
LAW. 127 (1975) (panel discussion); Introduction of the Speaker, 32 Bus. LAW. 1403 (1977)
(introducing Judge Pollack in proceedings of the ABA National Institute); Lawyers' Re-
sponses to Accountants in Connection with Audits, 30 Bus. LAw. 207 (1975) (panel discus-
sion); Securities Problems Relative to United States and Canadian Business
Transactions, 31 Bus. LAW. 801 (1976) (panel discussion).
257. This can be overdone. "Be respectful, of course, but also be self-respectful, and
neither disparage yourself nor flatter the Justices. We think well enough of ourselves
already." Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case
Preparation, 37 A.B.A.J. 801, 802 (1951).
258. F. WIENER, supra note 18, § 92, at 280. Counsel should seek intellectual equality
with the judges during the argument and not be "so terrified of the tribunal and so in awe
of its individual members that their questions . . .[throw counsel] completely off bal-
ance . . ." Id. § 101(a), at 299.
259. E. RE, supra note 18, at 195. The same has been said about humor in the written
brief. See H. WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WarrING STYLE 198 (1961).
(Vol. 4
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Questions should be answered when they are asked. Do not
respond to a question by saying you will come to that later, even
though the judge has interrupted your chain of thought and the
flow of your presentation. This is an important aspect of the
flexibility of which Wiener writes, and the ability to respond pre-
cisely to questions and to react to the flow of discussion is perhaps
the most important single skill for oral advocates.266 Be grateful
for the questions,2"' disrupting though they seem,262 for they tell
you what concerns the judges and give you an opportunity to
emphasize strengths and repair weaknesses in your case. Opin-
ions often turn upon those aspects of a case which were dwelt
upon by the judges in oral argument.
Because questioning is likely to consume the bulk of the argu-
ment, you can be confident only of being able to make brief
opening and closing statements. These should be planned with
care so that no matter how little else of your prepared remarks
you are able to deliver, you will be at least able to emphasize the
importance of the case and focus the most significant questions.2 13
Advise the court that you do not intend to waive or even to mini-
mize the importance of issues by excluding them from the oral
argument.
Most federal arguments are limited to twenty minutes per
side.26 Appellant's counsel may reserve part of his time for rebut-
tal, and it is usually wise to do so because the argument and
questioning of appellee's counsel may point to important matters
which appellant's counsel did not address. A caveat, however: Do
not use reserved rebuttal time to restate points already made. If
nothing new arose during appellee's presentation, simply inform
the court that you have no rebuttal. The court will appreciate
being saved a few minutes of its overburdened time, and your
belief that your opponent said nothing requiring rebuttal will
show confidence in your cause."'
In the Eighth Circuit as elsewhere a system of lights is used to
260. Accord, E. RE, supra note 18, at 196.
261. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A.J. 895, 897 (1940) ("Rejoice when
the Court asks questions.").
262. Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit has called for moderation from the bench in
asking questions. Godbold, supra note 5, at 818-19.
263. Recall what Mark Twain said: "The speaker who does not strike oil in ten minutes
should stop boring." E. RE, supra note 18, at 194.
264. See note 253 supra.
265. See notes 267-69 infra and accompanying text.
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alert counsel to time limitations. A white or green light on the
podium indicates that five minutes remain,"' and a red light that
time is up. The time limit is quite strictly enforced. Once the red
light is displayed, you will be permitted a final sentence or two,
but usually no more, even though the court's questions have pre-
vented you from covering many things you thought important.
Your preparation should equip you to answer any question rea-
sonably likely to arise, but if you do not know an answer, do not
be afraid to say so. Offer to obtain the answer after the argument
and provide it to the court and opposite counsel in writing. The
question may be as apparently inconsequential as whether the
appellant is in prison, and if so where, or as crucial as whether a
new statute affects the case. Though one hopes to have all the
answers, an admission of ignorance is better than a bluff, a lack
of candor, or an uninformed answer.
Vii. REPLY BRIEFS, REBUTTAL ARGUMENTS, AND PETITIONS FOR
REHEARING: A DISSUASIVE WORD
There is a natural but often unfortunate impulse, exaggerated
no doubt in the garrulous personalities of people who become
lawyers, to have the last word. A penultimate word of my own,
therefore, on reply briefs, rebuttal arguments, and petitions for
rehearing. (The re-prefixes are significant; they signify the asso-
ciation of those devices with words such as repetitious and redun-
dant.2 167) The rules provide for them, and very occasionally they
will repay the effort. Usually not. Do not file a reply brief unless
the appellee has raised facts or issues or arguments not treated
in your appellant's brief, and then only if you cannot reply ade-
quately at the oral argument.2 8 Do not give a rebuttal argument
unless appellee's counsel has argued something new or inaccu-
rate. Do not petition for rehearing unless the court's opinion
actually suffers from one of the specific defects for which rehear-
ing is provided.2 '
266. The Eighth Circuit courtroom in St. Louis uses a white light and the Eighth
Circuit courtroom in St. Paul uses a green light.
267. The prefix "re-" means "again" or "again and again." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1195 (1973).
268. An example justifying a reply brief would be where the appellee contends an order
is nonappealable and you have not discussed appealability in the opening brief.
269. The petition must raise "points of law or fact which ... the court has overlooked
or misapprehended . FED. R. App. P. 40(a). Do not file a petition simply because
you disagree with the result, unless, of course, the jurisdiction's rules require a petition
[Vol. 4
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VIII. CONCLUSION: JUDGING JUDGES
I have resisted the temptation to call the criminal appeal an
art, and called it a craft instead. Everyone is inclined to label his
own calling an art, and the word thereby becomes trite as well as
presumptuous. Yet I hope I have communicated my belief that
something transcending mere workmanship is involved, some-
thing expressed in the idea that the appellate advocate is not only
a lawyer, but a writer, in the literary sense. For after the rules
have been mastered, the factual material absorbed, and the legal
research done, it is the meticulous, the inventive and occasionally
inspired use of language that lifts mere draftsmanship into crafts-
manship and beyond.
I have tried, too, to emphasize the importance of a sense of
perspective, derived from an intimate knowledge of the facts and
law in the case at hand, and from an appreciation of the case's
relative position among others in the overburdened appellate
court. Appellate advocacy requires equal attention to the compet-
ing demands of completeness and brevity.
Finally, I have sought to go beyond the formal and stylistic
aspects of the appeal and touch upon some of the important and
elusive psychological currents generated by the relationships be-
tween the individual appeal and other cases past and future.
Judge Bright writes explicitly about the intrusive and censo-
rious nature of the appellate process: °
You must never forget that as appellate judges we are judges of
judges and our job is to make sure that the judicial system works
properly. . . . If you are to be successful advocates, you must
understand why and how appellate judges review the cases be-
fore them. You must understand the rationale behind our rules
of review . . . . These rules exist as an essential part of the
system, and if you wish to prevail on appeal, your briefs must
make perfectly plain that some prejudicial error occurred that
will justify our interference in the trial process.
Here more straightforwardly is the notion suggested in Mr.
Dooley's aphorism at the beginning of this Article.
Chief Judge Gibson, taking a rather broader view, speaks as
follows of counsel's r6le in the appellate process: 27'
for rehearing as a prerequisite to a further procedure such as certiorari. The filing of a
timely petition for rehearing stays the mandate. FFD. R. App. P. 41(a).
270. Bright, supra note 14, at 502 (emphasis added)
271. Gibson, supra note 29, at 261.
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The bench, to excel, must have the full backing and precisioned
advocacy of a knowledgeable bar. Your talents must be used not
only to represent clients in adversary hearings but also to en-
hance the general administration of justice by objectively point-
ing out to the courts where they might have erred.
These passages provide an appropriate coda because they con-
tain in short space and more authoritatively much of what I have
sought to say. If I may borrow an arresting phrase from each, and
combine them, we have a statement excellently suggesting the
difficulties and goal of appellate counsel: To reach a fair judg-
ment of judges by precisioned advocacy.
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